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This study enriches our understanding of three aspects of the economics of 
loan repayments by households and corporations: (1) residential mortgage 
default behavior, (2) residential mortgage partial prepayment behavior, and (3) 
corporate default risk.  
The first essay studies whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences 
correlates with their decision to default on their mortgage payments. Option 
theory predicts that borrowers should immediately exercise the default option 
when the market value of their mortgage exceeds the value of the underlying 
property. However, empirical evidence shows that a substantial number of 
borrowers are unlikely to default as ‘ruthlessly’ as option theory predicts. This 
indicates that mortgage borrowers are a heterogeneous group. In this essay, 
borrowers’ time preferences across mortgage choices are hypothesized as 
being heterogeneous. Borrowers can either have a present-biased preference 
(overvaluing immediate outcomes), or a time-consistent preference (standard 
exponential discounting). Borrowers with a present-biased preference are more 
likely to accept back-loaded mortgages that minimize up-front costs, even 
though this increases their risk of going “underwater” and entering default 
when negative home price shocks occur.   
The second essay studies the likelihood of making partial prepayments of 
mortgages and the process through which mortgage borrowers learn to make 
partial prepayment decisions in the residential mortgage market in China. The 
learning dynamics are measured by studying the repeated mortgage partial 
prepayment behavior of individual borrowers. As with full prepayments, 
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partial prepayment decisions impact the duration and pricing of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). However, unlike full prepayment, partial 
prepayment does not lead to a termination of the mortgage contract, allowing 
borrowers to repeat their actions in the future and learn from their early partial 
prepayment experiences. In the empirical tests, a longitudinal discrete choice 
model of the choice of mortgage payment is presented and estimated using a 
rich set of mortgage loan history data from a leading mortgage lender in 
China. The results indicate that path dependency and reinforcement learning 
arise whenever a borrower’s partial prepayment decision depends not only 
upon current stage variables and his/her individual characteristics, but also on 
the learning experience (both from self and others). Borrowers with more 
partial prepayment experience in earlier stages have a higher probability of 
making the same decision in the future. Moreover, learning dynamics are not 
monotonic, and recent experience plays a larger role than distal experiences in 
determining a partial prepayment decision.  
The third essay studies information beyond accounting and market variables in 
predicting the default of Chinese-listed companies. Although predicting the 
credit risk and the probability of default of companies is important, it is a 
challenging task for developing countries where information quality is poor. 
This essay comes up with a default probability prediction model for Chinese-
listed companies that addresses information quality issues. The results indicate 
that, while accounting and market variables provide useful information about 
corporate default, other variables, such as state ownership, the real effective 
exchange rate, the money supply, the short-term lending rate, the coincident 
index and inflation, provide additional information. These variables increase 
ix 
 
the predictive power of accounting and market variables assessing corporate 
default. In addition, the default risk of Chinese companies are correlated and 
clustered within their industry. Certain industries, such as communications and 
technology, tend to have a higher default risk than others. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Loan repayment behavior and the riskiness of borrowers have received much 
attention in recent years. Borrowers can vary from corporations to households 
who borrow to finance their purchases of a home. Studying the behavior of 
debtors in repaying their financial obligations is important for lenders and 
investors. 
A house is the single most important consumption good for a household, as 
well as being the dominant component of its wealth. However, since the value 
of a house usually exceeds a household’s ability to pay, households generally 
pay for their homes through mortgage contracts, in which they borrow from 
mortgage lenders. During the payment process, mortgagors can choose to 
either default or fulfil prepayments to terminate their mortgage contracts. 
Prepayments may be full or partial. Prepayments in full mean that borrowers 
pay off the mortgage completely before it matures. Partial prepayments, where 
borrowers pay off part of their mortgages, have been less studied in the 
literature. Unlike default and full prepayment, partial prepayments do not 
terminate mortgage contracts, but instead change the unpaid mortgage 





 Borrowers can carry out partial prepayments repeatedly. 
Understanding the different ways that mortgage borrowers decide to repay 
their mortgages is crucial for both mortgage lenders and investors of 
mortgage-backed securities. 
Most research on corporate borrowing has focused on corporate default risk. 
The credit risk of corporations is the oldest form of risk in financial markets, 
and it still continues to attract fervent interest among academics, practitioners 
and regulators. A typical method of corporate borrowing is corporate bonds, 
which are debt instruments issued by corporations. When they issue bonds, 
corporations promise to make specified payments to their bondholders based 
on the dates and amounts fixed in a contract. However, bondholders may not 
receive the promised payments in full or in part, because corporations may 
default on their agreement, causing bondholders to experience financial loss. 
Effectively estimating corporate default is crucial to those responsible for 
granting bank loans or investing in ﬁnancial products exposed to corporate 
default risk. 
1.1.1 Loan Repayment Behavior of Household 
Residential mortgages are a debt instrument in which an individual borrower 
uses real property as collateral to obtain a lump sum of money from a 
mortgage lender to finance a property purchase. In this process, according to 
the contract between the borrower and the lender, the borrower should make 
                                                          
1
 Partial Prepayment is defined as any extra money in addition to the monthly 
mortgage payment, and the extra amount paid will be used toward the reduction of 
the unpaid balance of the loan. In China, by making mortgage partial prepayment, 
borrowers can choose to shorten the horizon of their remaining loan term without 
lessening the regular monthly payments, or they can choose to reduce their monthly 
payment instead of shortening the remaining payment term. 
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monthly payments to the lender based on the mortgage contract. A mortgage 
can enter default if the borrower does not make the monthly payment. In this 
case, the lender can choose to take over the property to recover the balance of 
the loan. 
Defaulting on a mortgage is associated with substantial costs. First, mortgage 
default is costly to borrowers. By defaulting on their mortgages, borrowers 
will be penalized with a lower credit score and fewer opportunities to apply 
for mortgages and purchase homes in the future, as well as the emotional 
distress and moving costs. On the other side, mortgage default is also costly 
for mortgage lenders and investors. The net value of compensation from 
foreclosure is generally less than the asset value, and lenders will suffer a 
financial loss from a borrower’s decision to default on their mortgage and the 
ensuing foreclosure process (Quercia and Stegman 1992). Investors holding 
mortgage-backed securities are also exposed to the default risk of the 
mortgagor. After the financial crisis began in the last quarter of 2007 with the 
collapse of housing prices in the United States and the widespread rise in the 
default rates of both prime and subprime mortgages, more and more attention 
has been paid to mortgage default and foreclosures by scholars, policy analysts, 
and government officials.  
Under the “ruthless” hypothesis proposed by the contingent claims model, the 
well-informed borrower will default immediately when the mortgage value 
exceeds the property value at any time during the loan term (Titman and 
Torous 1989; Kau et al. 1992). Thus, the negative equity position of the 
homeowner is a key factor in affecting a borrower’s decision to default. Figure 
1-1 shows the distribution of homeowner equity in the second quarter of 2009. 
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There were nearly 32.2% of all mortgage properties in negative equity as of 
June 30, 2009 in US. Nevada had the highest percentage with nearly two 
thirds of mortgage borrowers in a negative equity position. For Arizona, 
Florida, Michigan, and California, the percentage of negative equity were 51%, 
49%, 48%, and 42% respectively. The total negative equity shares of these top 
five states were nearly 47% of the total negative equity in US. The more 
negative equity is, the higher the risk that the homeowners will lose their home. 
The scourge of negative equity and its quantitatively important role on default 
cannot be neglected. 































































Note: From Negative Equity Summary Report of CoreLogic, 2009 quarter two. Panel 
A is the equity distribution among the whole nation. Panel B is the distribution of 
negative equity of 25% or more among the top five states in US: Nevada, Florida, 
Arizona, California and Michigan. Panel C is the distribution of aggregate property 
value of homes in negative equity of the top five states in US: California, Florida, 
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Numerous papers have tried to address the triggers that contributed to the 
increasing number of mortgage defaults and foreclosures in the recent 
financial crisis. Some have pointed to lax underwriting standards, arguing that 
mortgage securitization reduced the lender’s incentive to be prudent, leading 
to lower underwriting standards in mortgage origination and eventually 
causing lower loan quality and higher default rates (Keys et al. 2010; Agarwal, 
Chang, and Yavas 2012; Keys, Seru, and Vig 2012). Still others have argued 
that irrational expectations regarding future house price growth should also be 
responsible for contributing to this subprime crisis. For instance, Mian and 
Sufi (2009) pointed out that lenders’ increased expectations of future house 
price growth may have been responsible for the increase in subprime mortgage 
credit. Other explanations include the rise of subprime lending, decline of risk 
premiums, and problems with credit rating agencies.   
However, compared to the number of borrowers who simply ‘walked away’ 
from their homes and those who defaulted, a large proportion of borrowers 
with negative equity continued to make their mortgage payments, even their 
mortgages were deeply underwater, including those who lived in “nonrecourse 
states” such as California and Arizona. 2  The fact that many borrowers 
continued repaying their underwater mortgages so as to keep their homes 
challenges traditional option models of well-informed borrowers operating in 
a world without economic frictions (see Vandell 1995). In a similar vein, 
Quigley and van Order (1995) found that there were no costs to default, other 
than the loss of the house in the “ruthless” default model. They emphasized 
                                                          
2
In non-recourse states, lenders cannot pursue defaulting homeowners for a deficiency 
judgment. While lenders can recover some of their losses by foreclosing on the 
property, they cannot sue borrowers for additional funds. If the foreclosure sale does 
not generate enough money to satisfy the loan, lenders must accept the losses.  
CHAPTER ONE                                                                     INTRODUCTION 
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the existence of transaction costs and their impact on default decisions. More 
recently, White (2010b) hypothesized that the shame and guilt of foreclosure 
and the large perceived penalties for defaulting keeps borrowers from default 
when it would be in their ﬁnancial interest to exercise the option. Indeed, 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) found that mortgage borrowers tended 
to view default as immoral, and continued to make their mortgage payments 
even when their mortgages were deeply underwater.  
Why would some homeowners choose to default on their mortgages while 
others continued to make payments on houses worth less than their mortgages? 
Chapter Two of this study focuses on this heterogeneous mortgage default 
behavior, as well as the underlying theory of unobserved heterogeneity among 
mortgage borrowers and the source of this unobserved heterogeneity.  
Besides choosing mortgage default, borrowers can also fully pay off their 
mortgages to terminate the mortgage contract. Full prepayment risk and 
default risk are the two most important types of termination risks, and have 
been examined in many studies, along with the resultant behavior of borrowers 
(Kau et al. 1992; Stanton 1995; Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 2000). A 
number of studies have explained either default or prepayment behaviors 
(Dunn and McConnell 1981a, 1981b; Quigley and Van Order 1991; Lekkas, 
Quigley, and Van Order 1993), while some papers have addressed them 
jointly (see Deng et al. 2000). 
Compared to default and full prepayment behaviors in the residential mortgage 
market, relatively few papers have examined mortgage partial prepayment 
behavior. A partial mortgage prepayment occurs when a borrower repays some, 
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8 
 
but not all, of a housing loan ahead of schedule. Just like full prepayment risk, 
partial prepayment also introduces risk to the duration of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), and affects their pricing. The uncertainty of a borrower’s 
partial prepayment decision increases the risk to mortgage lenders. In addition, 
investors holding portfolios of mortgage-backed securities are also exposed to 
the partial prepayment risk. However, a borrower’s partial prepayment 
decision is different from full prepayment, as it only changes the unpaid 
mortgage balance but does not terminate the mortgage contract. This allows 
the borrower to repeatedly engage in this behavior and learn from his/her early 
partial prepayment experience when making future decisions.  
Although partial prepayments may not be popular in the West, they can be 
frequently found in some regions and countries, such as China. Due to the 
absence of prepayment penalties, mortgage prepayment behavior (both partial 
prepayment and full prepayment) is very common in China (Figure 1-2). 
Partial prepayment of a mortgage introduces risk to mortgage securitization, 
with unique characteristics that are different from full prepayment behavior. 
As the mortgage market in China matures and becomes more competitive, 
there is an increasing need to understand the behavior of partial prepayment.  
Chapter Three of this study focuses on risk of partial prepayment among 
mortgage borrowers, and the processes through which mortgage borrowers 
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Figure 1-2 Partial Prepayment and Full Prepayment Rates in China Mortgage 
Market by Year 
 
Note: From a leading mortgage lender in China. Y-axis measures the full prepayment 
rate and partial prepayment rate, while X-axis measures the year. 
 
1.1.2 Corporate Loan Repayment Behavior  
The recent global financial crisis and the increased number of corporate 
defaults emphasize the importance of corporate credit risk management. A 
corporation is in default when it fails to make specified payments obligated to 
its creditors. Examples of corporate default include a bond default and 
corporate bankruptcy. Corporate defaults lead to ﬁnancial losses for a 
corporation’s creditors, and also have a negative impact on society and the 
overall economy. Understanding which variables are relevant for predicting 
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Researchers have used a variety of variables to predict corporate default in 
reduced-form corporate bankruptcy forecast models, which have proven to be 
a useful tool for predicting corporate bankruptcy (Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; 
Zmijewski 1984; Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie 2005). These models have two 
main objectives: identifying the relevant predictive variables and improving 
prediction accuracy.   
Earlier studies, such as Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and 
Zmijewski (1984), used accounting ratios as a measure of default risk. These 
ratios are derived from a firm’s operating environment and include size, book-
to-market equity ratio, and growth rate. More recently, researchers have 
proposed to use market-driven variables, derived from a firm’s information 
and trading environments, instead of accounting ratios to predict corporate 
bankruptcy. Their choice is based on the argument that a firm’s default 
probability should be perfectly reflected at all times in the market value of its 
equity (Shumway 2001; Chava and Jarrow 2004; Hillegeist et al. 2004; 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2008).  
Emerging markets are becoming increasingly important engines of global 
economic growth. As their economies have developed, their corporate default 
rates have stabilized in recent years (Figure 1-3), especially after the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-8. However, within developing countries, information 
quality becomes a potential issue when applying both the accounting-based 
model and the market-driven model to predict corporate default. Developing 
countries, including those in Asia, are prone to poor accounting and legal 
standards. Moreover, institutional effects play a unique role in several Asian 
CHAPTER ONE                                                                     INTRODUCTION 
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markets, making stock prices less informative in these markets. As one of the 





In addition, more and more attention has been paid to the performance of the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which play a very important and 
unique role in China’s economy. Since the founding of the People's Republic 
of China, SOEs have undergone several waves of reform. Although the 
number of SOEs has decreased, the important role of SOEs in Chinese 
economy has not changed (Deng et al. 2011). Except for their rentability, 
which is similar to that of the non-SOEs, SOEs also have a special social 
function in China. For example, they should serve the macro-economy to 
Note: From Standard & Poor’s Global Fixed Income Research and Standard & Poor’s 
CreditPro. Count excludes defaults that were not rated one year prior to default. Other 
developed includes Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand.  
Figure 1-3 Annual Corporate Defaults by Number of Issuers 
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optimize the allocation of resources within the scope of the whole society, 
balance regional economic development to realize the rational layout of 
economy, and control the lifeline and other important areas of the national 
economy to protect China's economic, political and military security. The 
special role of state ownership may lead to corporate default in China having 
some unique characteristics. 
According to Moody’s (2010), significant industry fixed-effects exist in the 
bankruptcy of US firms (Figure 1-4). It can be seen from Panel A, that in 2010, 
almost 23% of the defaults occurred in the debt issued by the Capital 
Industries sector.
3
 Issuers in the Consumer Industries sector accounted for the 
next highest share of defaults at 18%.
4
 Although the Capital Industries sector 
accounted for 23% of defaults in 2010, it was not the sector with the highest 
rate of default. That distinction belongs to the Media & Publishing industry, 
which had a 3.6% default rate in 2010. Chava and Jarrow (2004) emphasized 
that industry groupings have significant effects on the forecasting equations of 
corporate default. The similar industry fixed-effects are supposed to be existed 
for Chinese listed companies. 
                                                          
3
 Capital industries sector includes automotive, capital equipment, chemicals, 
plastics & rubber, construction & building, containers, packaging, & glass, 
forest products & paper, metals & mining, and business service industries. 
4
 Consumer industries sector includes beverage, food, & tobacco, durable & 
non-durable consumer goods, healthcare & pharmaceuticals, hotel, gaming, & 
leisure, and consumer service industries. 
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Note: From Moody’s 2010. 
 
Overall, information beyond accounting and market variables needs to be 





































Panel B Default Rate by Broad Industry 
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Chapter Four of this study focuses on the information required to predict the 
corporate default of Chinese listed companies.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
This research aims to explore three main aspects of the loan repayment 
behavior of households and corporations: residential mortgage defaults, partial 
prepayments of residential mortgages, and corporate default risk.  
The first essay examines whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences 
is correlated with their decision to default on their mortgage by measuring 
borrowers’ time preferences using their mortgage type choice. In particular, it 
investigates whether borrowers who exhibit present-biased preference – those 
who are more likely to accept back-loaded mortgages that minimize up-front 
costs – have a higher chance of their mortgages going “underwater” and into 
default following negative home price shocks. The research questions for the 
first essay are “What are the origins of borrowers’ unobserved heterogeneity?” 
and “Do heterogeneous borrowers’ time preferences correlate with their 
default decisions?” 
The second essay explores the risk of partial prepayment and the reinforced 
learning process of borrowers in the Chinese mortgage market. It aims to add 
to the understanding of the partial prepayment behavior of borrowers, which 
has been previously neglected in the literature. This essay also aims to provide 
strong evidence to support the important role of learning in explaining partial 
prepayment behavior using individual loan-level data. Lastly, since emerging 
markets are fast becoming important engines of the global economy, it is 
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important for more research on them. This study contributes to this by 
examining the mortgage market in one of the most important emerging 
markets, China. The research questions for the second essay are “What factors 
affect the partial prepayment decisions of Chinese mortgage borrowers?” and 
“Is there any learning process in the partial prepayment decisions?” 
The third objective of this study is to build a bankruptcy prediction model that 
overcomes the data limitations of Asian companies, especially Chinese-listed 
companies. This model will make use of information beyond accounting and 
market variables to predict the default probability of Chinese-listed companies. 
Specifically speaking, there are four main research questions. First, “How 
useful are accounting and market variables in predicting the default 
probability of Chinese-listed companies?”  Second, “What is the impact of 
state ownership on corporate default after controlling for variations in the 
financial performances of observable firms?” Third, “Do macroeconomic 
variables provide additional information that is beyond firm-specific 
accounting and market information on corporate default?” Finally, “How is 
the default risk of Chinese-listed companies correlated and clustered?” 
1.3 Knowledge Gaps 
1.3.1 Time Preferences, Mortgage Choice and Mortgage 
Default 
Over the past thirty years, substantial studies have been proposed to explain 
default risk and the default behavior of mortgagors. Research in this area is 
mainly based on option theories, which provide useful frameworks for 
analyzing borrowers’ behavior. The “pure” option-based theoretical mortgage 
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pricing models assume that well-informed borrowers will default ‘ruthlessly’ 
once their mortgage value exceeds their property’s value at any time during 
the term of their loan (Titman and Torous 1989; Kau, Keenan, and Kim 1993). 
Nevertheless, while negative equity may be a necessary condition to trigger 
default, it is not a sufficient one (Vandell 1995; Deng et al. 2000; Bajari, Chu, 
and Park 2008; Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan 2010). Exercising the default option 
means to give up the option to default and refinance later on (Kau, Keenan, 
and Kim 1994). Empirical evidence shows that substantial borrowers are less 
likely to default as ‘ruthlessly’ as the option theory predicts.  
These pure option-based models build on perfectly competitive markets 
without any transaction or reputation costs, and with no exogenous reasons for 
residential mobility. However, the idea of a “frictionless” market in option 
theory is an ideal assumption, since transaction costs have a significant impact 
and are expected to cause individuals to strategically default or prepay. 
Substantial empirical research using the option-based framework has 
attempted to illustrate and explain this phenomenon by arguing that the 
transaction costs resulting from default are pervasive and significant for 
borrowers (Stanton 1995; Archer, Ling, and McGill 1996; Harding 1997). The 
literature assumes that the transaction costs, such as moving costs, reputational 
issues, and default penalties, are sufficiently high to force homeowners to 
leave their homes. In addition to the economic considerations of transaction 
costs, attention has also been focused on the emotional constraints to strategic 
default. Using survey data, Guiso et al. (2013) documented that social and 
moral considerations may partially play a role in explaining the willingness of 
homeowners to continue paying their underwater mortgages.  
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The role of transaction costs is important in determining the exercise of both 
default and prepayment options. What causes these strategic default borrowers 
to accept the economic and emotional transaction costs? Empirically, the 
unobserved heterogeneity of mortgage borrowers is extensively discussed in 
existing literature (Stanton 1995, 1996; Deng et al. 2000; Hall 2000).  
Given the above, transaction costs and unobserved heterogeneity have a clear 
role when examining mortgage default. However, unobserved heterogeneity is 
still a black box that attracts much attention. Researchers have been unable to 
provide an underlying theory to explain the unobserved heterogeneity of 
borrowers or its origins. Chapter Two in this study tries to fills this gap by 
assuming that borrowers’ time preferences are heterogeneous, and shows that 
heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences correlates with their mortgage 
default decisions. 
1.3.2 Reinforcement Learning and Mortgage Partial 
Prepayment Behavior  
In the mortgage market, prepayment risk and default risk are the most 
important two general types of borrower’s termination risk. The literature has 
widely studied these risks and the corresponding borrower’s behavior (Kau et 
al. 1992; Stanton 1995; Deng et al. 2000). Most studies are based on the 
contingent claims models, where prepayments are treated as American call 
options and defaults as compound put options. While some studies pay 
attention only to full prepayment behavior (Dunn and McConnell 1981a, 
1981b; Buser and Hendershott 1984; Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Schwartz 
and Torous 1989), others focus only on mortgage default risk (Cunningham 
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and Hendershott 1984; Foster and Van Order 1984, 1985; Vandell and 
Thibodeau 1985; Titman and Torous 1989; Quigley and Van Order 1991; Kau, 
Keenan, and Kim 1993; Lekkas, Quigley, and Van Order 1993). A series of 
papers has emphasized the importance of examining full prepayment and 
default options jointly, and treated them as competing risks in determining 
mortgage termination (Kau et al. 1994; Kau and Keenan 1996; Deng, Quigley, 
and Van Order 1996; Deng 1997; Deng et al. 2000).  
Relative to the extensive literature on default and full prepayment behavior in 
the residential mortgage market, only a few papers have been conducted on 
the partial prepayment behavior of borrowers. Hayre and Lauterbach (1991) 
were the first to emphasize the distinct role of partial prepayment behavior, 
which is unlike full prepayment, and they tried to capture the effect of partial 
prepayment by adding an average constant dollar amount each month in the 
prepayment model. Chinloy (1993) built both theoretical and empirical models 
which treat full prepayment and partial prepayment as separate decisions to 
dislodge the analysis bias. Abrahams (1997) discussed the effect of partial 
prepayment on full prepayment modelling. Overall, only a few papers pay 
attention to partial prepayment, relatively to default and full prepayment 
behavior in the mortgage literature.  
Learning is a multi-disciplinary area which draws much attention from 
economics, psychology, cognitive science, computer science, mathematics, 
and neural science (Bush and Mosteller 1955; Cross 1973; Arthur 1991, 1993; 
Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998). There has been growing interest in 
the effects of learning and experience on an individual decision-making. 
However, because of data limitation, most economic studies have analyzed 
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learning either in laboratories or in the ﬁeld. Only a few papers have examined 
learning using individual micro-level data.  
Since 1998, the Chinese housing market has developed rapidly and undergone 
significant reform. Correspondingly, the Chinese residential mortgage market 
has grown quickly and continues to attract attention. However, little research 
has been conducted on the Chinese mortgage market because of data 
limitations.  
In short, in the literature on mortgage payment behavior, there exists a gap in 
our understanding of the partial prepayment risk of borrowers and their 
associated behavior. In the literature on learning, there is a gap in studying 
learning using micro-level data. Chapter Three in this study fills these two 
gaps by modelling the learning behavior of borrowers through repeated 
mortgage partial prepayment decisions. In addition, Chapter Three also 
contributes to the literature on the Chinese mortgage market.  
1.3.3 Information beyond Accounting and Market Variables in 
Predicting Corporate Default 
Accurately predicting the probability of corporate default is of great interest to 
all academics, practitioners and regulators. Research in this area mainly 
focuses on Western markets, and studies vie to increase the accuracy of their 
default predictions by using different mixes of accounting-based and market-
driven variables. 
Beaver’s (1966) pioneering work used a business failure prediction model 
based on financial ratios derived from corporate financial reports to show that 
certain financial ratios were statistically significantly related to corporate 
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failure. Building on that work, a huge body of literature has been generated to 
predict corporate default using different accounting-based variables. For 
example, Altman (1968) extended Beaver’s (1966) work by investigating a set 
of financial and economic ratios into a Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
(MDA) model to derive the Z-score measure for predicting bankruptcy. 
Taffler (1983) used the same technique to generate the UK-based Z-score. 
Altman, Haldeman, and Naraganan (1977) used Quadratic Discriminant 
Analysis (QDA) which incorporated comprehensive inputs to identify 
bankruptcy risk of firms. Ohlson (1980) applied a conditional logit model to 
predict corporate default (known as “O-score”), which included seven 
accounting-based explanatory variables. Zmijewski (1984) performed a probit 
model based on accounting data but uses a different set of independent 
variables as previous studies. Lau (1987) constructed a five-state financial 
distress prediction model, and recognized a firm would enter each of the five 
states of financial distress using a multinomial logit model. However, models 
based on accounting variables are criticized because they are backward-
looking, prone to manipulation, and underestimate book value.  
Compared to backward-looking accounting ratios, the information in stock 
prices tends to be more forward-looking. Therefore, market-driven variables 
have been used in default prediction models to improve the accuracy of their 
forecasts. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), used an option-
pricing method, and initiated the large amount of research on the use of 
market-based variables.  Key studies in this area include Crosbie and Bohn 
2002), Hillegeist et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Reisz and Perlich 
(2007), and Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
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However, both accounting-based models and market-driven models cannot be 
used in developing countries because of their poor accounting and legal 
standards and less informative stock prices (Shleifer and Robert 1994; Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu 2000). These concerns about information quality extend 
equally to China, one of the leading economies in the emerging market. 
Given the above mentioned concerns, although accounting ratios and market-
driven variable discriminant analysis can be used to improve our 
understanding in Western markets, the same cannot be used in China. 
Information beyond accounting ratios and market variables is needed to 
predict the probability of Chinese companies entering default. Chapter Four of 
this study focuses on filling this gap. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
In the first essay, setting borrowers’ heterogeneous time preferences against 
their mortgage choices may improve our understanding of the variety of 
mortgage default behavior, and will help develop better policies to deal with 
the issues ensuing from the housing foreclosure crisis, such as mortgage 
modifications and mortgage contract design. 
The second essay in this study will enhance our understanding of partial 
prepayment behavior, which has been neglected in the literature. In addition, 
the findings will provide valuable insights about the housing and mortgage 
markets in China, as well as those in other transition economies. Lastly, by 
studying the learning process in partial prepayment decisions, this essay will 
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provide strong evidence to support the important role of learning in explaining 
partial prepayment behavior in the mortgage market. 
The model that is developed in the third essay will be a useful tool for risk 
assessment and management. This essay will hopefully remind lenders and 
investors to be aware of other factors that affect lending and investment risks, 
and suggest that policy makers should take into consideration the impact of 
monetary policy on the likelihood of corporate default.     
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter One presents the research 
background, research objectives, research questions, and significance of the 
research. Chapter Two comprises the first essay, entitled “Time Preferences, 
Mortgage Choice and Mortgage Default”, which examines the correlation 
between the heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences and their default 
decisions. Chapter Three consists of the second essay, entitled “Reinforcement 
Learning and Mortgage Partial Prepayment Behavior”. It explores the risk of 
residential mortgage partial prepayments and how learning reinforces the 
behavior of borrowers in residential mortgage markets. Chapter Four presents 
the third essay, entitled “Predicting Default of Chinese Companies: 
Information beyond Accounting and Market Variables”. This chapter 
investigates the role of information besides accounting and market variables in 
predicting the default of Chinese-listed companies. The final chapter 
concludes this thesis, and summarizes its contributions. It also highlights the 




Chapter 2 Time Preferences, Mortgage Choice 
and Mortgage Default 
2.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 triggered by the stunning rise of subprime 
mortgage delinquencies has led to a re-evaluation of mortgage defaults and 
foreclosures. In the past five years, millions of homeowners in the United 
States “walked away” and allowed their homes to be foreclosed. Moreover, 
according to CoreLogic’s negative equity report, owners of 11.1 million 
residential properties were in negative equity (i.e. they were “underwater”) 
and at the risk of foreclosure by the end of 2011.
5
 Table 2-1 lists the ten states 
with the highest levels of negative equity and near negative equity in the 
United States.
6  Compared with borrowers who simply “walked away” and 
those in default, most underwater homeowners still continued to make their 
mortgage payments. However, it is difficult to know beforehand which 
borrowers will be in default, because there is significant heterogeneity among 
them. This leads us to wonder why some homeowners choose to default on 
their mortgages, while others do not. 
                                                          
5
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic-reports-negative-equity-increase-
in-q4-2011.aspx Accessed on March 15, 2012.  
6
 Properties that are in negative equity, where the borrower owes more on their 
mortgage than the property’s current market value, are often termed as being 
“underwater” or “upside down”. Mortgages that are within five percent of being in a 
negative equity position are defined by CoreLogic as being “near negative equity”. 
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Table 2–1 Negative Equity in Selected States of US 
State Negative Equity Share Near Negative Equity 
Share 
Nevada 56.90% 5.30% 
Florida  42.10% 4.10% 
Arizona 38.60% 5.10% 
Georgia 35.60% 6.30% 
Michigan  32.00% 4.80% 
California  28.30% 4.50% 
Illinois 25.40% 4.60% 
Ohio 23.80% 5.70% 
Maryland 22.90% 4.80% 
Idaho 22.30% 5.30% 
Note: From Negative Equity Summary Report of CoreLogic, Jan-2013.  
 
This chapter studies whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences 
correlates with their decision to default on their mortgage payments. 
Borrowers’ time preferences are measured using their choice of mortgage type. 
In particular, it investigates borrowers who exhibit present-biased preference, 
that is, those who are more likely to accept back-loaded mortgages that 
minimize up-front costs and place them at greater risk of becoming 
underwater and default following negative home price shocks. 
After the pioneering work by Asay (1978), there was a quick expansion of 
studies on mortgage valuation and borrower behavior based on the contingent 
claims models, mainly developed by Black and Scholes (1973), Merton 
(1973a), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). The contingent claims model 
provides a useful framework for analysing borrowers’ behavior, in which 
prepayment is treated as an American call option and default as a compound 
put option. The “pure” option-theoretic mortgage pricing models assume that a 
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well-informed borrower will default immediately when the mortgage value 
exceeds the value of his/her property at any time during the loan term (Titman 
and Torous 1989; Kau, Keenan, and Kim 1994). These models assume a 
perfectly competitive market without any transaction or reputation costs, and 
no exogenous reasons for residential mobility. Despite a frictionless market 
being an ideal case, negative equity may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition to trigger default (Vandell 1995; Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 
2000; Bajar, Chu, and Park 2008). Evidence shows that a substantial number 
of borrowers are unlikely to default as ‘ruthlessly’ as the option theory 
predicts. White (2010b) argued that not all homeowners who were underwater 
on their mortgage walked away from their home immediately during the 
recent financial crisis, including those who lived in “nonrecourse states”, such 
as California and Arizona. Although such behavior may appear irrational on 
its face, the homeowners who stayed and those who walked away all struggled 
with the same decision: to continue paying their mortgage or not. 
Many empirical studies have tried to explain this ‘irrational’ phenomenon 
using the option-based framework. The anecdotes underlying these studies 
emphasize that the transaction costs resulting from default are pervasive and 
significant (Stanton 1995; Archer, Ling, and McGill 1996; Harding 1997).
7
 
These studies assume that these transaction costs, which include moving costs, 
reputational issues, and default penalties, are high enough to deter 
homeowners from leaving their homes. In addition to the economic 
consideration of transaction costs, recent attention has been paid on the 
emotional constraints to strategic default. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
                                                          
7
For an explicit discussion about these transaction costs, see Kau, Keenan, and Kim 
(1993).  
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(2013), using survey data, documented that social and moral considerations 
may play a partial role in explaining the willingness of homeowners to 
continue to pay their underwater mortgages. White (2010b) also argued that 
the shame or guilt associated with foreclosure and fear over the perceived 
consequences of foreclosure led those underwater homeowners choose not to 
default.  
The role of transaction costs is important in determining the exercise of both 
the default and prepayment options. What causes default borrowers to accept 
the economic and emotional transaction costs that accompany their default 
decision? The empirical unobserved heterogeneity of mortgage borrowers has 
been discussed extensively in the literature, but only as an unproven 
assumption. For example, Deng et al. (2000) assumed that borrowers are 
heterogeneous agents who form discrete groups, and Hall (2000) assumed that 
these agents have different distributions of underlying hazards. Stanton (1995, 
1996) and others have also argued that heterogeneity exists within mortgage 
pools. However, researchers have been unable to provide a theoretical 
framework for this unobserved heterogeneity or explain its origins.  
The present study tries to fills this gap by assuming that this unobserved 
heterogeneity is based on borrowers’ time preferences, and it examines 
whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences is correlated with their 
mortgage default decisions. Two kinds of time preferences exist for borrowers, 
with corresponding discounting factors: present-biased preference 
(overvaluing immediate outcomes), and time-consistent preference (standard 
exponential discounting). The key distinction between these two is the 
presence and absence of a “present bias”. Individuals with present-biased 
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preference prefer immediate gratification, and, as a result, are more likely to 
minimize their up-front costs and postpone their mortgage payment. They are 
thus more likely to select back-loaded mortgages, such as interest-only loans. 
This selection is more likely to place them at a higher risk of going underwater 
and defaulting following negative home price shocks. 
The hypothesis is made that naïve borrowers with present-biased preference 
are more likely to select interest-only loans which allow them to enjoy the 
immediate benefits of homeownership and postpone their mortgage payment 
costs. Sophisticated borrowers with present-biased preference, on the other 
hand, are fully aware of their future self-control problems, and know their 
future preference exactly, even though they may differ from their current 
preference. Therefore, they are smart and more likely to choose 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans. In contrast, borrowers with time-consistent preference 
tend to choose 30-year fixed-rate loans, which are fully amortizing mortgage 
loans where the interest rate on the note remains the same through the term of 
the loan. 
Two main databases are used in this chapter: mortgage data at the level of 
individual loans, principally collected by BlackBox Logic (BBL), and home 
loan application and origination data, collected by the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA). This chapter uses a logistic regression to examine 
how borrowers’ time preferences influence their mortgage choice and their 
default decisions. The fixed effects are the year of origination, year of 
termination, and the state in which the property is located. Firstly, the default 
behavior of naïve borrowers who selected interest-only loans, relative to those 
who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans is studied. The results indicate that 
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borrowers with 5-year interest-only loans are around 41 percentage points 
more likely to default than those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans. In 
addition, borrowers with 10-year interest-only loans are around 47 percentage 
points more likely to default than dynamically-consistent borrowers who 
chose 30-year fixed-rate loans.  
The further regression is done by studying the default behavior of borrowers 
who chose 30-year adjustable-rate loans relative to those who chose 30-year 
fixed-rate loans. Results indicate that sophisticated borrowers who chose 30-
year adjustable-rate loans are 27 percentage points more likely to default than 
borrowers who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans. In other words, the default 
rate of sophisticated borrowers with present-biased preference is higher than 
borrowers with time-consistence preference.  
Lastly, the default behavior of both interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-
rate loans relative to those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans is examined. 
The results indicate that present bias is highly correlated with mortgage 
default, and borrowers who exhibit present-biased preference in their choice of 
mortgages have a substantially higher probability of default. Borrowers with 
5-year interest-only loans are around 35 percentage points more likely to 
default than those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans, and borrowers with 
10-year interest-only loans are around 39 percentage points more likely to 
default than dynamically-consistent borrowers who chose 30-year fixed-rate 
loans. In addition, the default probability of borrowers with 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans is 24% higher than borrowers who chose 30-year fixed-
rate loans. The association between present bias and mortgage default holds 
when controlling for other loan characteristics and housing price. Moreover, 
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all of the results hold after using propensity score matching, based on 
borrowers’ characteristics (including income, race, sex) and loan 
characteristics (e.g. original loan balance, location of property, origination 
year, etc.) for different loan types. These results are therefore the first direct 
support for the claim that the mortgage default decisions of borrowers is 
related to their different time preferences.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in sections 2.2, the 
relationship between this chapter and the prior literature is presented; in 
section 2.3, following the original work of Phelps and Pollak (1968) (later 
employed by Laibson (1994, 1997, 1998) and other papers), a typical form of 
present-biased preference (i.e., quasi-hyperbolic) is presented; time 
preferences and mortgage choices are illustrated in section 2.4; section 2.5 
outlines and describes the data used in this chapter; section 2.6 discusses the 
default behavior for different mortgage types using a logistic model; and 
section 2.7 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Relationship to the Prior Literature 
This chapter contributes to several strands of the existing literature. First, it 
contributes to the broader literature on mortgage default. It presents an 
alternative theory to explain the origins of the unobserved heterogeneity of 
mortgage borrowers and how this unobserved heterogeneity affects borrowers’ 
default decisions and behaviors. The “frictionless” market is an ideal 
assumption, and transaction costs have a significant impact on the likelihood 
of individuals’ decisions to strategically default or prepay. Foster and van 
Order (1984) found that borrowers would not default “ruthlessly”, and 
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exercised the put option of default if the value of their house fell below the 
mortgage value by an amount equal to the net transaction costs. Therefore, we 
argue that a pure option-based theory cannot fully explain mortgage default 
behavior, and the impact of transaction costs on the mortgage default decision 
is important (Cunningham and Hendershott 1984; Foster and Van Order 1984, 
1985; Vandell and Thibodeau 1985; Quigley and Van Order 1991; Lekkas, 
Quigley, and Van Order 1993).  
In addition to the above studies that conjecture the existence of transaction 
costs, some other studies try to test the importance of transaction costs and 
incorporate them into default risk modelling. For example, Lekkas et al. (1993) 
and Quigley and Van Order (1995) explicitly tested the ‘frictionless’ models, 
and validated the importance of transaction costs besides equity position.
8
 
Deng et al. (2000), Deng, Pavlov, and Yang (2005), and Clapp, Deng, and An 
(2006) stressed the importance of borrower and spatial heterogeneity 
associated with transaction costs.
9
 Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1993) and Kau and 
Slawson (2002) included both transaction costs and suboptimal termination 
into mortgage pricing models. 
At the same time, transaction costs are complicated and differ across mortgage 
holders, creating significant unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers. The 
role of unobserved borrower heterogeneity in explaining mortgage termination 
has also attracted much attention. Richard and Roll (1989), Schwartz and 
                                                          
8
Clauretie (1987) and Hendershott and Schultz (1993) explicitly included non-equity 
variables, like costs of foreclosure, unemployment rate and showed their significance 
for foreclosure rates. 
9Other examples incorporating market imperfections to “frictionless” models include 
Vandell et al. (1993), Archer et al. (2002), Van Order and Zorn (2000), Clapp et al. 
(2001), Pavlov (2001), Calhoun and Deng (2002), Goldberg and Harding (2003), etc. 
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Torous (1989), and Archer, Ling, and McGill (1996) all suggested the existing 
of ad hoc variables in analysis of pools, and addressed heterogeneity within 
mortgage pools. Stanton (1995, 1996) extended previous research to handle 
heterogeneity between mortgage pools. Deng et al. (2000) considered the issue 
of unobserved heterogeneity in the context of hazard modelling, and they 
explicitly accounted for the unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers by 
adding discretely distributed mass point mixed hazard. This research has been 
followed by Clapp, Deng and An (2006). Although transaction costs and 
unobserved heterogeneity have been discussed extensively in empirical studies, 
there is no unifying theory to explain the underlying unobserved heterogeneity 
of borrowers.  
This chapter also adds to the literature on individual different time preferences, 
which has been addressed both in psychology and behavioral economics. Past 
research has documented that individual differences in time preference are an 
important predictor in many life choices such as gym contracts (DellaVigna 
and Malmendier 2006), smoking (Gul and Pesendorfer 2007), body-mass 
index (Smith, Bogin, and Bishai 2005; Courtemanche and Carden 2011), 
savings for retirement (Carroll et al. 2009), and credit card debt (Laibson, 
Repetto, and Tobacman 2007; Chabris, Laibson, and Schuldt 2008; Reimers et 
al. 2009; Meier and Sprenger 2010; Kuchler, 2013). In addition, Krusell, 
Kuruscu, and Smith (2010) analysed the effects of present bias on optimal 
taxation. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) used present bias preference to 
explain individual job search behaviour. However, researchers have not 
studied the effects of present bias on mortgage choice and default, and 
relatively few papers on mortgage choice and default have distinguished 
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between naïve and sophisticated individuals. In this chapter, heterogeneous 
time preferences among borrowers, as indicated by their mortgage choices, are 
used to explain the default behavior of present-biased borrowers. Different 
mortgage types are also used to differentiate naïve and sophisticated borrowers.  
2.3 Present-Biased Preference  
Traditional inter-temporal preference models in economics have captured the 
impatience of agents by using exponential discounting. This approach 
explicitly assumes that preferences are inter-temporally consistent. However, 
this standard economic assumption may not be applicable in all instances 
when we are considering trade-offs between two future moments. Specifically, 
individuals with present-biased preference tend to give relatively more weight 
to nearer moments in the future as they get closer, and their inter-temporal 
preferences are time inconsistent (O' Donoghue and Rabin 1999a).  
One way of modelling present-biased preference is to use "quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting" or "(β, δ)-preference". This method was originally developed by 
Phelps and Pollak (1968), and was later employed by Laibson (1994, 1997, 
1998) to capture self-control problems within an individual. This method is 
widely used in the literature (e.g. O’ Donoghue and Rabin 1999a, 1999b, 
1999c, 2001; Carrillo 1999; Fischer 2001) and will be used in this chapter.  
Let    be the instantaneous utility the borrower gets in period t, and 
                       be the borrower’s inter-temporal preference function 
from the perspective of period t. Borrowers are assumed to have quasi-
hyperbolic preference. Time is divided into two periods: the present period (t) 
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and all future periods (beginning from t+1 to T). The inter-temporal preference 
function for borrowers with present-biased preference can be expressed as: 
                                                   
      ∑  
    
 
     
  
      [   ]               
As in the standard exponential discounting model, the parameter   represents 
the “time-consistent” long-run discounting factor. In this inter-temporal 
preference model, an additional parameter   is added into the standard time-
consistent model for the future period to capture an individual's “bias for the 
present” – i.e., the agent’s preference for the current over all future periods. 
There are two types of  :     and      .  
For    , 
                                                      ∑  
 
 
   
   
The inter-temporal preference function reduces to a standard exponential 
discounting utility function with time-consistent inter-temporal preference (the 
discrete version). Under this time preference, borrowers treat the present 
period and all future periods the same.  
For      , 
                                                 
      ∑  
   
 
      
This function parsimoniously captures present-biased preference, and greater 
weight is assigned to the present relative to the future. The β-parameter in this 
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model thus fully captures the dynamic-inconsistency suggested by present-
biased preference (O’ Dognohue and Rabin 1999a, 1999b 1999c).  
If time-inconsistent preference is assumed, an individual at each time period is 
modelled as a separate agent who maximizes utility according to her current 
preference, while her “future selves” will control her future behavior based on 
the prevailing preferences in the future (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999a). An 
important question following this assumption is: what does an individual 
believes about her future selves’ preferences? A crucial insight from the 
present-biased preference perspective is the distinction between naïve and 
sophisticated individuals. A sophisticated individual is fully aware of her 
future self-control problems, and knows her future selves’ preferences exactly, 
even though they may differ from those of the current self. In contrast, a naïve 
individual does not anticipate her future procrastination, and is thus fully 
unaware of her future self-control problems. This inclines her to believe that 
her future preferences will be identical to her current ones. Under such a 
distinction, choices of naïve individual and sophisticated individual are 
different.  
2.4 Time Preferences and Mortgage Choice 
Selecting a mortgage is a consequential consumer choice that highlights the 
role of time preferences in determining outcomes.
10
 While mortgage are often 
complex and differ along many dimensions, they can be broadly classiﬁed into 
                                                          
10
 Carroll et al. (2009) modelled the optimal policies of 401(k) saving for present 
biased consumers; DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) studied the present biased 
consumers’ contract choice among health club, and concluded that consumer’s 
preferences among contract were important; Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) 
illustrated how payment and consumption events can be optimally timed and linked. 
CHAPTER TWO                                                           MORTGAGE DEFAULT 
35 
 
two main categories based on their repayment structure: back-loaded 
mortgages and front-loaded mortgages. A second dimension of interest is the 
length of repayments. Mortgage contracts typically involve repayment periods 
of 30-year, but can also be structured for shorter periods, such as 10-year. The 
selection of a particular payment structure is an indication of a borrower’s 
intertemporal preferences 
A fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) is a fully amortizing mortgage loan where 
the interest rate on the note remains the same through the term of the loan, as 
opposed to "floating" loans where the interest rate may adjust. As a result, the 
payment amounts and loan duration of an FRM are fixed and the person who 
is responsible for paying back the loan benefits from a consistent, single 
payment and the ability to plan a budget based on this fixed cost. The constant 
discounting for fixed-rate mortgage implies that a person’s intertemporal 
preferences are time-consistent, which means that any decision that the 
individual makes for himself in advance will remain valid as time advances, 
and later preferences “confirm” earlier preferences. Therefore, borrowers with 
time-consistent preference (standard exponential discounting) will choose 
fixed-rate mortgages. 
An interest-only loan is a loan in which, for a set term, the borrower pays only 
the interest on the principal balance, with the principal balance unchanged. At 
the end of the interest-only term, the borrower may enter an interest-only 
mortgage, pay the principal, or (with some lenders) convert the loan to a 
principal and interest payment (or amortized) loan at his/her option. 
Mortgages such as interest-only loans are particularly appealing to present-
biased individuals because they present lower upfront costs in return for 
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greater later costs. In addition, with the absence of self-control, interest-only 
loans are more likely to be selected by naïve borrowers who are fully unaware 
of their future self-control problems, minimize their up-front costs and 
postpone the payment on their mortgages.  
In contrast, ‘sophisticated’ borrowers who have present-biased preference, or 
suffer from short-term temptations and are aware of the consequences, are 
likely to prefer to control themselves from temptation and behave more 
rationally. When selecting a mortgage, sophisticated borrowers may be 
worried about the minimal up-front costs and the corresponding future over-
payments, and may refrain from them so as to induce themselves to resist 
temptation in the future. This means that, unlike naïve borrowers, 
sophisticated borrowers will not choose interest-only loans. However, they 
will also not choose fixed-rate loans, which would be preferred by time-
consistent borrowers. An adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) is a mortgage 
loan where the interest rate on the note is periodically adjusted based on an 
index which reflects the cost to the lender of borrowing on the credit markets. 
Adjustable-rate mortgage loans are similar to interest-only loans, in that they 
allow borrowers to enjoy minimal up-front costs, and differ from fixed-rate 
mortgage loans, in that loan repayments are not a consistent amount. 
Therefore, sophisticated borrowers with self-control will be more likely to 
choose an adjustable-rate mortgage. 
2.5 Data 
Two main sources of data are used in this chapter: individual loan-level 
mortgage data, from BlackBox Logic (BBL), and the database of home loan 
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applications and originations collected by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA).  
BlackBox Logic (BBL) is a private company that provides a comprehensive, 
dynamic dataset with information about twenty-one million privately 
securitized subprime, Alt-A, and prime loans in the United States. These loans 
account for about ninety percent of all privately securitized mortgages. The 
BlackBox data, which is obtained from mortgage services and securitization 
trustees, includes static information taken at the time of the origination of 
mortgages, such as the mortgage contract date, original loan amount, the initial 
loan-to-value ratio, borrowers’ FICO credit scores, mortgage service name, 
mortgage contract interest rate, mortgage term, interest rate type, state, region, 
and major metropolitan area in which the property is located. In addition, the 
BlackBox data also include dynamic data on monthly payments, mortgage 
balances, current loan to value ratio, and delinquency status.  
The HMDA database is available at the loan application level.
11
 It is an annual 
database that contains each applicant’s ﬁnal status 
(denied/approved/originated), purpose of borrowing (home 
purchase/reﬁnancing/home improvement), loan amount, borrowers’ attributes 
(race, gender, income, and home ownership status), and also (in the case of 
originated loans) whether the loan was sold to the secondary market within the 
year. In addition, the location of property is clearly recorded in the HMDA 
database.  
                                                          
11
 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), enacted by Congress in 1975 and 
implemented by the Federal Reserve Board, requires lending institutions to report 
public loan data. The lending institutions mainly include banks, savings associations, 
credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions. 
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The analysis in this chapter is confined to first-lien mortgage loans issued 
between 1995 and 2011, and includes those loans that were either closed or 
still active at the third quarter of 2012. The analysis is confined to 5-year 
interest-only loans, 10-year interest-only loans, 30-year fixed-rate loans and 
30-year adjustable-rate loans. After removing mortgages with incomplete 
information on LTV ratio, original loan balance, FICO score and other key 
information, the final sample includes 3,058,413 individual mortgages.  
Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of loan origination over the years. Generally, 
the number of all kinds of loans grew tremendously between 2001 and 2006. 
In 2005, the number of originations of interest-only loans and adjustable-rate 
loans reached a peak. The number of fixed-rate loans originations peaked in 
2006. Before 2003, the origination of fixed-rate loans dominated the loan 
market, and this changed from 2004. The origination of interest-only and 30-
year adjustable-rate loans expanded very quickly from 2004. Moreover, the 
number of interest-only loans grew at a faster rate than both fixed-rate loans 
and adjustable-rate loans. After the financial crisis, the origination of all kinds 
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Figure 2-1 Frequency Distribution by Origination Year: Full Sample 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency distribution of all kinds of loans originations 
for the full sample. Y-axis measures the frequency of origination, while X-axis 
measures the year. Three loan types are included in this sample: interest-only loans, 
30-year fixed-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans.  
 
Figure 2-2 focuses on the loan origination growth in four states (i.e., 
California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada). Consistent with the dramatic growth 
as shown in Figure 2-1, the origination of all kinds of loans grew 
tremendously between 2001 and 2006 in these four states. In addition, the 
origination of interest-only loans increased particularly fast in California (CA), 
Arizona (AZ) and Nevada (NV). In these three states, the origination of 
interest-only loans in 2005 and 2006 was more than twice the number of 30-
year fixed-rate loans. Consistent with Figure 2-1, the number of originations 
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Figure 2-2 Frequency Distribution by Origination Year: Four States 
  
  
Note: This figure shows the frequency distribution of all kinds of loan originations for four states: California (CA), Florida (FL), Arizona (AZ) and Nevada 
(NV). Three loan types are included in this sample: interest-only loans, 30-year fixed-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. Y-axis measures the 
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Table 2-2 show the summary statistics of the BlackBox (BBX) dataset. 
Information on three types of first-lien mortgage loan originations between 
1995 and 2011 are kept: interest-only loans (5-year and 10-year), 30-year 
fixed-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. 26.7% of the loans are 
interest-only loans, with 10.62% being 5-year interest-only loans and 16.08% 
10-year interest-only loans. 36.31% of the loans are 30-year fixed-rate loans, 
and 36.99% are 30-year adjustable-rate loans. Borrowers have an average 
FICO score of 663.52, and borrowed up to 79.15% of the property value (LTV) 
in the sample. 
Columns (2) to (4) show the summary statistics for each loan type separately. 
Nearly 40% of interest-only loans are 5-year interest-only loans. Loans and 
borrowers have distinct characteristics for each loan type. The average amount 
borrowed is the highest among interest-only loans, nearly two times the 
amount borrowed for 30-year adjustable-rate loans. The FICO scores for 
interest-only loans are the highest with an average of 699.496. Borrowers who 
opted for 30-year adjustable-rate loans have the lowest FICO score of 617.575. 
The average amount borrowed for interest-only loans and 30-year fixed-rate 
loans is similar, and is up to 77% of the property’s value. However, the 
average amount borrowed for 30-year adjustable-rate loans is much higher 
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Table 2–2 Summary Statistics of Variables: Full Sample 
 Original total IO Loans FIX30 ARM30 
IO5 10.62% 39.77%   
IO10 16.08% 60.23%   
FIX30 36.31%  100%  
ARM30 36.99%   100% 
Current Interest rate 7.001 5.969 6.984 7.790 
Original Loan 
Balance 
225143.32 312080.52 216238.08 171130.41 
FICO Score 663.52 699.496 683.866 617.575 
OrigLTVRatioCalc 79.150 77.176 77.187 82.502 
ownerocc 84.44% 81.68% 81.36% 89.45% 
low_no_doc 45.22% 60.37% 45.88% 33.62% 
subprime 29.34% 8.85% 18.89% 54.38% 
Duration 56.606 54.444 62.426 52.452 
LOG_MHPI 5.168 5.203 5.150 5.161 
Sample size  3,058,413 816,569 1,110,638 1,131,206 
Note: This table presents the aggregate-level summary statistics of BlackBox dataset. 
The sample only include 5-year interest-only loans, 10-year interest-only loans, 30-
year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. Comprarsion of the average 
values of variables by full sample, interest-only loans, 30-year fix-rate loans and 30-
year adjustable-rate loans are presented. ‘IO5’ is represetation of the 5-year interest-
only loans, takes the value of one for 5-year interest-only loans and zero for others; 
‘IO10’ is represetation of the 10-year interest-only loans, takes the value of one for 
10-year interest-only loans and zero for others; ‘FIX30’ is represetation of the 30-year 
fix-rate loans, takes the value of one for 30-year fix-rate loans and zero for others; 
‘ARM30’ is represetation of the 30-year adjustable-rate loans, takes the value of one 
for 30-year adjustable-rate loans and zero for others; ‘Original Loan Balance’ is 
defined as the amount of principal on the closing date of the mortgage; ‘FICO Score’ 
refers to the Fair Issacs borrowers score at the time of loan origination. 
‘OrigLTVRatioCalc’ refers to the ratio of the original loan amount to the property 
value at loan origination; ‘Ownerocc’ takes the value of one if the property type is 
owner occupied and zero for others; ‘low_no_doc’ takes the value of one if the 
documentation type of the loan is low or no documentation and zero for others; 
‘Subprime’ equals to one if loan is subprime and zero for others; ‘Duration’ is the 
duration of the loans in month, which is defined as the elapsed time from origination 
to the end of the sample period or to the first classification as being prepaid or 
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Figure 2-3 suggests the default pattern for each type of loan over the period 
being studied. The default rate for each type of loan increased dramatically 
after the recent financial crisis, especially for interest-only loans and 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans. Both the default frequency and default percentage 
reached their peaks in 2011 for all kinds of loans. In addition, it can be seen, 
from both the frequency and percentage of default distributions, that the 
default rate for interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans is much 
higher than 30-year fix-rate loans from 2008 to 2011. Figure 2-4 suggests that 
the default patterns in the four states are consistent with the full sample. 
Particularly, the default frequency for interest-only loans after the recent 
financial crisis is much higher than the default frequency for others type of 
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Figure 2-3 Default Distribution over Years: Full Sample 
A. Frequency Distribution of Default by Year 
 
B. Percentage of Default by Year 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the frequency and percentage of default distribution for all 
kinds of loans over year. In panel A, Y-axis measures the frequency of default loans, 
while X-axis measures the year. In panel B, Y-axis measures the default rate, while 
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Figure 2-4 Default Distribution over Years: Four States 
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Note: This figure shows the default frequency and percentage distribution of all kinds of loans by year for four states: California (CA), Florida (FL), Arizona 
(AZ) and Nevada (NV). In panel A, Y-axis measures the frequency of default loans, while X-axis measures the year. In panel B, Y-axis measures the default 
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2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default 
Logistic regression is employed to study the default behavior of interest-only 
loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans, relative to 30-year fix-rate loans. 
Table 2-3 reports the regression coefficients and odds ratios in the full sample 
analysis. Consistent with existing findings on the determinants of the default 
behavior, owner-occupancy, lower LTV ratio, high FICO score and lower loan 
balance predict a lower default rate in general. In addition, lower or no 
documentation loans are risky, and their default probabilities are higher. 
Column (1) shows the regression results of interest-only loans relative to 30-
year fixed-rate loans. It can be seen that 5-year interest-only loans are 41% 
more likely to default than 30-year fixed-rate loans after controlling other loan 
characteristics. The default probability for 10-year interest-only loans is 47.4% 
higher than that for 30-year fixed-rate loans, after controlling other loan 
characteristics.  
The results in column (2) show the regression results for 30-year adjustable-
rate loans relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans. 30-year adjustable-rate loans are 
26.8% more likely to default compared with 30-year fixed-rate loans, after 
controlling for other loan characteristics. The last column shows the results in 
the full sample analysis, where the default probabilities for both interest-only 
loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans are 
presented. Compared with 30-year fixed-rate loans, the default probability of 
5-year interest-only loan is 34.9% higher, and that for 10-year interest-only 
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loans is 39.3% higher. 30-year adjustable-rate loans are 24.4% more likely to 
default relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans. Moreover, the default probability 
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Table 2–3 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Full Sample 
Variables IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 






























































































Observations 1,927,207 2,241,844 3,058,413 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6892 0.6504 0.6788 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for BlackBox dataset. 
The sample only includes 5-year interest-only loans, 10-year interest-only loans, 30-
year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. The dependant varaible is 
‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero for others. The definitions 
of the independent variables are shown in Table 2-2. State, current year and 
origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios for Logit regression are 
reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2-4 presents the sub-sample default analysis in California, Florida, 
Arizona and Nevada respectively. As shown in Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-4, the 
patterns of origination and default for each loan type in these four states are 
similar to the full sample. Consistent with the results from the full sample, the 
average default rates for interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans 
are higher relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans, and the default probability of 
30-year adjustable-rate loans is lower than interest-only loans. However, 
compared with the results in Table 2-3, the default probability of interest-only 
loans relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans in these four states is higher than the 
general results, and the default probability of 30-year adjustable-rate loans 
relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans in these four states is lower than the 
general results. In particular, in California, borrowers of 5-year interest-only 
loans are around 58.6 percentage points more likely to default than those who 
selected 30-year fixed-rate loans, and 10-year interest-only loans borrowers 
are around 64.5 percentage points more likely to default than those who 
selected 30-year fixed-rate loans. On the other hand, in California, 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans borrowers are around 25.6 percentage points more likely 
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Table 2–4 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Four States 
Panel A Logistic Regression: State of California (CA) 
 IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 




















Observations 437,487 322,103 573,012 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.8000 0.7900 0.8063 
 
Panel B Logistic Regression: State of Florida (FL) 
 IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 




















Observations 171,346 191,050 266,849 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.7961 0.7992 0.8019 
 
Panel C Logistic Regression: State of Arizona (AZ) 
 IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 




















Observations 128,980 110,668 187,854 
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Panel D Logistic Regression: State of Nevada (NV) 
 IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 




















Observations 75,076 52,577 103,097 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.8236 0.8167 0.8241 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for four representative 
states, i.e., California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada. The dependant varaible is 
‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero for others. We do not report 
the entire list of control variables, and refer to Table 2-3 for the full lists. The 
definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 2-2. State, current year 
and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios for Logit 
regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level; 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2-5 presents the sub-sample default analysis by setting the financial 
crisis as a break point. Specifically, the sample is divided into two parts: loans 
that terminated before the financial crisis and loans that terminated after 
financial crisis.
12
 Generally speaking, for both before and after financial crisis 
sample, all results are consistent with the results in the full sample. Before the 
financial crisis, 5-year interest-only loans were 14.5% more likely to default 
than 30-year fixed-rate loans, after controlling for other loan characteristics. 
The default probability for 10-year interest-only loans is only 8.9% higher 
than that for 30-year fixed-rate loans, after controlling other loan 
characteristics.  
                                                          
12
 For simplicity, the financial crisis is defined as beginning at the start of 2009. 
Therefore, the two parts of the sample are: loans that terminate before the end of 2008 
and loans that terminate after the beginning of 2009. 
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The results changed dramatically after the financial crisis. 5-year interest-only 
loans were 44% more likely to default than 30-year fixed-rate loans, after 
controlling for other loan characteristics. The default probability of 10-year 
interest-only loans was 50.6% higher than 30-year fixed-rate loans. However, 
the results for 30-year adjustable-rate loans compared to 30-year fixed-rate 
loans were the same. This divergence in the findings can be explained by the 
higher probability for back-loaded mortgages that minimize up-front costs to 
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Table 2–5 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Financial Crisis Break 
Point 
 IO VS FIX_30 ARM_30 VS FIX_30  ARM_30 & IO VS 
FIX_30 



















Observations 398,861 623,388 768,469 
Pseudo R-
Squared 
0.2292 0.2702 0.2457 



















Observations 1,528,346 1,618,456 2,289,944 
Pseudo R-
Squared 
0.6962 0.6665 0.6909 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for financial crisis break 
point. For simplify, here the time of financial crisis defined as the beginning of 2009. 
Therefore, the two parts of sample are: loans terminate before the end of 2008 and 
loans terminate after the beginning of 2009.The dependant variable is ‘default; takes 
the value of one for default loans and zero for others. We do not report the entire list 
of control variables, and refer to Table 2-3 for the full lists. The definitions of the 
independent variables are shown in Table 2-2. State, current year and origination year 
fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios for Logit regression are reported in 
brackets. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
CHAPTER TWO                                                           MORTGAGE DEFAULT 
55 
 
2.6.2 Robustness Analysis: Propensity Score Matching 
The original loan size and other observable attributes of each loan type are 
systematically different (see Table 2-2), and directly comparing their default 
may be misleading with an unbalanced sample. Therefore, propensity score 
matching (PSM) is used to obtain a more homogeneous sample for each 
comparison sample to mitigate the potential bias.
13
 Specially, a one-to-one 
match for each treatment group based on the original loan balance, origination 
year, location of property (MSA level) and other loan and borrower 
characteristics is performed. 
Table 2-6 reports the summary statistics of the matched sample. Although 
propensity score matching is not able to entirely eliminate the difference in 
loan and borrower characteristics of the interest-only loans and 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans relative to the 30-year fixed-rate loans, the gap between 
those observables is greatly reduced across these three loan types after 
matching. Firstly, interest-only loans (the treatment group) are matched with 
30-year fixed-rate loans (the control group) to mitigate the potential bias. In 
the matched sample, 22.44% the loans are 5-year interest-only loans and 27.56% 
are 10-year interest-only loans. The statistics of all the variables are very 
similar after matching for interest-only loans and 30-year fixed-rate loans. 
Second, the summary statistics are shown by matching 30-year adjustable-rate 
loans (the treatment group) with 30-year fixed-rate loans (the control group). 
Lastly, both interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans (the 
                                                          
13
 The BlackBox dataset has fewer borrowers’ characteristics than the HMDA dataset. 
Therefore, firstly, the HMDA dataset is matched with the BlackBox dataset to obtain 
more information about mortgage borrowers, including borrowers’ race, sex, income, 
and home ownership status. Then the propensity score matching is carried out based 
on the combined information from both datasets.  
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treatment group) with 30-year fixed-rate loans (the control group) are matched. 
After matching, 22.08% of the loans are interest-only loans, with 8.54% 
having a duration of 5-year and 13.54% being 10-year long, and 27.64% of the 
loans are 30-year adjustable-rate loans. In the treatment group, 44.72% of the 
loans are interest-only loans, with 17.08% being 5-year interest-only loans, 
27.65% being 10-year interest-only loans, and 55.28% of the loans being 30-
year adjustable-rate loans. 
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Table 2–6 Summary Statistics of Variables: Propensity Score Matched Sample 






IO Loans Fix30 Matched 
total 





IO5 22.44% 44..88%     8.54% 17.08%  
IO10 27.56% 55.12%     13.54% 27.65%  
ARM30    50%  100% 27.64% 55.28%  
Current Interest rate 6.311 5.943 6.777 7.388 7.304 7.473 6.889 6.779 6.997 
Original Loan Balance 253257.42 260233.81 246281.03 174980.54 173859.90 176101.17 205232.94 204689.88 205776.01 
FICO Score 694.293 694.035 694.552 644.457 644.736 644.178 673.229 672.690 673.768 
OrigLTVRatioCalc 77.304 77.356 77.253 81.168 81.239 80.980 78.672 78.561 78.768 
ownerocc 85.81% 85.85% 85.76% 88.33% 88.79% 87.86% 85.65% 85.38% 85.92% 
low_no_doc 53.84% 53.88% 53.80% 37.70% 37.13% 38.26% 43.56% 43.21% 43.90% 
subprime 11.18% 11.35% 11.01% 34.20% 34.23% 34.17% 23.42% 23.98% 22.85% 
Duration 58.259 55.896 60.621 58.063 62.828 53.299 31.361 55.893 62.829 
LOG_MHPI 5.183 5.202 5.165 5.154 5.138 5.171 5.164 5.176 5.151 
Sample size  625,444 312,722 312,722 671,158 335,579 335,579 1,008,224 504,112 504,112 
Note: This table presents the aggregate-level summary statistics of BlackBox dataset after Propenstiy Score matching. The sample only include 5-year 
interest-only loans, 10-year interest-only loans, 30-year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. Comprarsion of the average values of the variables by 
full sample, interest-only loans, 30-year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans are presented. Definition of variables are the same as in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-7 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis on the default 
behavior of interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans relative to the 
30-year fixed-rate loans in the matched sample. The findings are broadly 
consistent with those in Table 2-3: in the matched sample, the average default 
rate of interest-only loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans is higher relative 
to that for 30-year fixed-rate loans, and the default probability for 30-year 
adjustable-rate loans is lower than that for interest-only loans.  
Column (1) shows the regression results of interest-only loans relative to 30-
year fixed-rate loans after matching. It can be seen that 5-year interest-only 
loans are 49.4% more likely to default than 30-year fixed-rate loans after 
controlling for other loan characteristics. In addition, the default probability of 
10-year interest-only loans is 44.8% higher than 30-year fixed-rate loans after 
controlling for other loan characteristics. The results in column (2) have 
shown that 30-year adjustable-rate loans are 22.6% more likely to default 
compared to 30-year fixed-rate loans, after controlling for other loan 
characteristics and propensity matching. The last column shows the results in 
the full sample analysis, where the default probabilities of both interest-only 
loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans relative to those for 30-year fixed-rate 
loans are presented. Compared with 30-year fixed-rate loans, the default 
probability of 5-year interest-only loans is 30.9% higher, and 31.6% higher for 
10-year interest-only loans. The 30-year adjustable-rate loans are 21.7% more 
likely to default relative to 30-year fixed-rate loans. Moreover, the default 
probability of 30-year adjustable-rate loans is lower than the default 
probability of interest-only loans.  
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Table 2–7 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default:  
Propensity Score Matched Sample 


































































































Observations 625,444 671,158 1,008,224 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6868 0.6378 0.6456 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for BlackBox dataset 
after Propensity Score matching. The sample only includes 5-year interest-only loans, 
10-year interest-only loans, 30-year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans. 
The dependant varaible is ‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero 
for others. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 2-2. State, 
current year and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not 
reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios for 
Logit regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2-8 presents the sub-sample default analysis in California, Florida, 
Arizona and Nevada respectively in the matched sample. The results are 
consistent with those in Table 2-4: the average default rates of interest-only 
loans and 30-year adjustable-rate loans are higher relative to 30-year fixed-rate 
loans, and the default probability of 30-year adjustable-rate loans is lower than 
that for interest-only loans. The default probability of interest-only loans is 
particular high in California, where borrowers of 5-year interest-only loans are 
around 70.1 percentage points more likely to default than those who selected 
30-year fixed-rate loans, and borrowers of 10-year interest-only loans are 
around 56.2 percentage points more likely to default than those who selected 
30-year fixed-rate loans. 
Table 2–8 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Four States of Propensity 
Score Matched Sample 
Panel A Logistic Regression: State of California (CA) 
























Observations 120,666 89,928 156,870 
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Panel B Logistic Regression: State of Florida (FL) 
























Observations 51,886 62,388 92,234 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.7949 0.8027 0.7893 
 
Panel C Logistic Regression: State of Arizona (AZ) 
























Observations 34,012 29,700 43,448 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.7917 0.7807 0.7724 
 
Panel D Logistic Regression: State of Nevada (NV) 
























Observations 16,732 13,234 19,452 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.8099 0.8129 0.8077 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for four representative 
states after Propensity Score matching, i.e., California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. 
The dependant varaible is ‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero 
for others. We do not report the entire list of control variables, and refer to Table 2-3 
for the full lists. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 2. 
State, current year and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but 
not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios 
for Logit regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2-9 presents the sub-sample default analysis by setting the financial 
crisis as a break point in the matched sample. The results are consistent with 
those shown in Table 2-5: the default probabilities of both interest-only loans 
and 30-year adjustable-rate loans are higher than 30-year fixed-rate loans. 
However, there is a great deal of difference between the results before and 
after financial crisis. Before the financial crisis, borrowers of 5-year interest-
only loans were around 20.4 percentage points more likely to default than 
those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans, and borrowers of 10-year interest-
only loans were around 7.8 percentage points more likely to default than those 
who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans. After the financial crisis, borrowers of 
5-year interest-only loans were around 51.3 percentage points more likely to 
default than those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans, and borrowers of 10-
year interest-only loans are only around 47.5 percentage points more likely to 
default than those who selected 30-year fixed-rate loans. The results for 30-
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Table 2–9 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Financial Crisis Break 
Point of Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 IO VS FIX_30 ARM_30 VS FIX_30  ARM_30 & IO VS 
FIX_30 



















Observations 96,862 167,070 203,072 
Pseudo R-
Squared 
0.1960 0.2664 0.2624 


















Observations 512,398 492,250 789,000 
Pseudo R-
Squared 
0.6962 0.6471 0.6603 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for financial crisis break 
point after Propensity Score matching. For simplify, here the time of financial crisis 
defined as the beginning of 2009. Therefore, the two parts of sample are: loans 
terminate before the end of 2008 and loans terminate after the beginning of 2009.The 
dependant variable is ‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero for 
others. We do not report the entire list of control variables, and refer to Table 2-3 for 
the full lists. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 2-2. 
State, current year and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but 
not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and estimated odds ratios 
for Logit regression are reported in brackets. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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2.6.3 Loans Originated between 2004 and 2007 
The subprime mortgage market grew extremely quickly between 2001 and 
2007. Kiff and Mills (2007), among others, argued that this was facilitated by 
the development of private-label mortgage backed securities, which do not 
carry the kind of credit risk protection offered by government-sponsored 
enterprises. Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) analysed loans that originated 
between 2001 and 2006 and found that, during the dramatic growth of the 
subprime (securitized) mortgage market, the quality of the market deteriorated 
dramatically. In addition, significant changes to Regulation C, which 
implemented the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), took effect in 
January 2004. These changes, designed primarily to enhance the 
understanding of mortgage markets and assist in fair lending enforcement, 
increased the amount and types of public information about residential real 
estate lending. Because of the dramatic growth of loans and new regulations, a 
sub-sample that consisted of mortgages originating between 2004 and 2007 is 
created and ran the same regressions as Table 2-3 and Table 2-6.
14
 The results 
are consistent with what have been found in the previous sections (see Table 
2-10). 
 
                                                          
14
 The sub-sample analysis of loans originated between 2004 and 2007 for four states 
and the financial crisis break point was also done, but the results were not reported in 
the chapter. The results are consistent with previous results. 
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Table 2–10 Time Preferences and Mortgage Default: Loans Originated between 2004 and 2007 
Sample Original Sample Matched Sample 
 
Variables 
IO VS FIX30 ARM30 VS 
FIX30 
IO & ARM30 VS 
FIX30 








































































































































 Original Sample Matched Sample 
Variables ARM_30 VS 
FIX_30 








IO & ARM_30 
VS FIX_30 






















































Observations 1,567,667 1,654,772 2,447,692 571,868 504,368 770,614 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6903 0.6460 0.6762 0.6831 0.6337 0.6510 
Note: This table shows results of logistic regression analysis for BlackBox dataset with loans originated between 2004 and 2007: both before and after 
Propensity Score matching. The sample only includes 5-year interest-only loans, 10-year interest-only loans, 30-year fix-rate loans and 30-year adjustable-
rate loans. The dependant varaible is ‘default; takes the value of one for default loans and zero for others. The definitions of the independent variables are 
shown in Table 2-2. State, current year and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and estimated odds ratios for Logit regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 




The financial crisis triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis meant that an 
economic recession spread from the US to the rest of the world. This led us to 
reconsider residential mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Mortgage default 
behavior is complex. Correctly identifying the different types of default 
behaviors that borrowers engage in is not only important for mortgage lenders 
and investors of mortgage backed securities, but also crucial for policy makers.  
This chapter investigates whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time 
preferences as manifested in their mortgage choices correlates with their 
default decision. It presents evidence to explain the underlying theory of 
borrowers’ unobserved heterogeneity and the source of this unobserved 
heterogeneity. Results indicate that present-biased borrowers who select back-
loaded mortgages are more likely to default than dynamically consistent 
borrowers. In particular, naïve borrowers with present-biased preferences, who 
are more likely to select interest-only loans, default earlier than borrowers of 
other types of loans. If borrowers have present-biased preferences or suffer 
from short-term temptations and are aware of the consequences (termed as 
'sophisticated' as opposed to 'naïve'), then it is likely they will prefer to refrain 
from the temptation and behave more rationally. The default of sophisticated 
borrowers follows the naïve borrowers. For dynamically-consistent borrowers, 
the choice of fixed-rate loans leads them to default less frequently than others. 
The relationship between present bias and mortgage default is maintained 
when controlling for borrowers’ demographics and loan characteristics. 
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Overall, borrowers’ heterogeneous time preferences as seen in their choice of 
mortgage types may help to better understand mortgage default behavior, and 
will assist in the creation of better policies to deal with the foreclosure crisis, 





Chapter 3 Reinforcement Learning and 
Mortgage Partial Prepayment Behavior 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the mortgage market, prepayment and default risk are the two most 
important types of termination risks, and many studies have studied them and 
the corresponding behavior of borrowers (Kau et al. 1992; Kau, Keenan, and 
Kim 1994; Stanton 1995; Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 2000). Compared to 
full prepayment risk and default, little research has been conducted on the 
partial prepayment risk of borrowers in the residential mortgage market. 
Similar to default and full prepayment risk, partial prepayment also introduces 
risk to the duration of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and affects their 
pricing. However, unlike default and full prepayment decision, the partial 
prepayment decision of a borrower only changes the unpaid mortgage balance. 
It does not terminate the mortgage contract, thereby allowing the borrower to 
perform repeated actions in the future and to learn from his/her early 
experiences when making future decisions. 
The field of learning draws attention from various fields, such as economics, 
psychology, cognitive science, computer science, mathematics, and neural 
science (Bush and Mosteller 1955; Cross 1973; Arthur 1991, 1993; Roth and 
Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998). There has been growing interest in the
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 effects of learning and earlier experience on an individual’s decision-making 
(Ho and Chong 2003; Agarwal et al. 2006). The main stance taken in this 
literature is that agents react ‘adaptively’ when facing certain circumstances. 
For example, Erev and Roth (1998) found that reinforcement learning allowed 
for good predictions of an individual’s future behavior. However, because of 
data-collection challenges, few papers have studied learning using individual 
micro-level data.  
This chapter studies the risk of mortgage partial prepayment and the process 
through which mortgage borrowers learn to make partial prepayment decisions 
in the residential mortgage market in China. The learning dynamics of 
borrowers are measured by studying individual borrowers’ repeated partial 
prepayments. Without terminating the mortgage contract, partial prepayments 
allow borrowers to learn from their early experiences, as well as those of 
others, to make repeated decisions in the future. In this chapter, reinforcement 
learning is manifested as the higher probability of borrowers who make more 
partial prepayments at earlier stages of their mortgage deciding to continue 
making partial prepayments, while controlling for other variables.  
Since the reforms and the rapid development of the housing market from 1998, 
China’s residential mortgage market has developed quickly. By the end of 
2012, the total value of outstanding residential mortgages was 61 trillion RMB 
Yuan, approximately 9.9 trillion US dollars.
15
 The mortgage environment in 
China is quite different from the US. US research on prepayment risk usually 
examines full prepayments. However, in China, partial prepayments are quite 
popular, because there is no penalty for prepayments. Thus, to study 
                                                          
15
 1 Chinese Yuan = 0.162351 U.S. dollars 
CHAPTER THREE                               MORTGAGE PARTIAL PREPAYMENT 
71 
 
prepayment risk in China, one must distinguish between the probability of full 
prepayment and partial prepayment because a borrower can make these two 
decisions separately.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter uses a rich set of individual mortgage 
payment history data from a leading mortgage lender in China. The 
informative loan history dataset contains not only mortgage loan information, 
but also borrowers’ characteristics and their payment decisions for their 
mortgages in each period.
16
 This longitudinal dataset contains information on 
172,328 individual loans that originated between 2003 and 2010 with 
5,282,182 monthly payment events.
17
 This chapter focuses on partial 
prepayments, and asks whether the probability of mortgage borrowers 
choosing to partially prepay is higher once they have gained more experience. 
The empirical model is based on the conditional fixed effects multinomial 
logit model (FEMNL) (Rasch 1960; Chamberlain 1980).  
The results indicate that ‘option theory’ does not play a significant role in 
determining mortgage partial prepayments in China. Instead, other financial 
factors, such as stock market investment opportunities, play a major role. 
Secondly, borrowers’ characteristics, such as age, job position, gender, and 
income, are important indicators for predicting borrowers’ partial prepayment 
behavior. In addition, following Deng and Quigley (2012), a behavioral 
                                                          
16 At each period, borrowers can choose from: ‘default’, ‘paid off/ full prepayment’, 
‘partial prepayment’, and ‘continue make monthly payment’. In China, the minimum 
amount of partial prepayment is 10,000 Chinese Yuan, and there is no prepayment 
penalty for both full prepayment and partial prepayment. 
17
 The original database contains a large number of mortgage observations and 
payment events on single family mortgage loans issued from 2003 to 2010. The 
regression data used in this chapter is based upon a random sample of ten percent of 
those mortgages loans. 
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correlate of the unobserved heterogeneity of individual borrowers is created 
and added into the model to improve the estimation of mortgage holders’ 
responses. Lastly, and most importantly, a borrower’s partial prepayment 
behavior follows the reinforcement learning process. A borrower’s partial 
prepayment decision depends not only upon current stage variables (such as 
other investment opportunities that he/she can engage in) and his/her 
characteristics, but also past experiences. Borrowers can learn from their own 
experiences, as well as those of others. Borrowers who make more partial 
prepayments early on have a higher probability of making the same decision in 
the future. In particular, the self-learning experience increases the probability 
of partial prepayment by around 26.9 percentage points, and the experience of 
learning from others increases the probability of partial prepayment by around 
1.8 percentage points. 
Moreover, the results show that learning dynamics are not monotonic, as 
borrowers act as if their knowledge depreciates – i.e., learning patterns exhibit 
a recency effect. Recent experience plays a larger role than older experience in 
determining the partial prepayment behavior of borrowers.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: in section 3.2, a brief introduction of house 
prices and the mortgage market in China is given; section 3.3 presents the 
relationship between this chapter and prior literature; Section 3.4 summarizes 
the data and presents the empirical evidence for learning and backsliding; the 
last section concludes this chapter. 
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3.2 The House Price and Mortgage Market in China 
China is the largest developing economy and its housing market has 
increasingly attracted academic attention. Since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the housing market in China has 
experienced several waves of reform. A milestone reform event happened in 
1998 with the issue of the 23
rd
 Decree: housing was no longer allocated to 
citizens, kick-starting the modern private housing market. From then on, the 
government would no longer distribute housing to the public and all 
households were required to buy or rent a house from the private housing 
market. This change brought about a new stage of development in the Chinese 
housing market. The number of privately-built houses and house prices began 
to grow dramatically.  According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
investment in China’s real-estate sector was 30 trillion Chinese Yuan (4.5 
trillion US Dollar) in 2008, having increased by 20.9% compared to the 
previous year.  
Figure 3-1 shows the average house price and floor area of residential houses 
that built from 1998 to 2012. It can be seen that both house prices and the 
number of houses built increased remarkably in this period. House prices 
increased by about 193% over the 15-year period from 1998 to 2012, while the 
number of completed residences increased by more than two times in the same 
period. House prices increased from 2004, mainly because of the launch of a 
public land auction and listing system, with the first land auction in China 
being held in Shenzhen in 1987. However, from 1987 to 2004, there were no 
public auctions of land parcels. Developers were required to contact local 
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governments about land parcels they were interested in, and they would then 
negotiate a price without an auction. From 2004, a policy that all residential 
and commercial urban land had to be listed and auctioned publicly was 
implemented (Wu, Gyourko, and Deng 2012). From then on, all developers 
were required to bid at auctions for the land they desired, which may have 
contributed to the obvious increase in house prices from 2004. 




Note: This is from National Bureau of Statistics. The house price here is the average 
house price across the whole country, and is calculated as ‘Total Residential House 
sale’/’Total Floor Area of Sale’. The floor area of completed residential houses is the 
total floor area that has been completely built. The left Y-axis measures house prices 
in Chinese Yuan per square meters, while the right Y-axis measures the floor area of 
completed residential houses in thousand square meters. The X-axis indicates the year. 
 
The rise of the booming real estate market also contributed to the development 
of the mortgage market in China. From 2005 to 2012, the outstanding balance 
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Report of Loans of Financial Institutions in 2012" from the People's Bank of 
China, up to the end of 2012, commercial banks held nearly 9.5 trillion 
Chinese Yuan worth of residential mortgages and the share of residential 
mortgages in the total value of loans they made rose to 16% from 4% between 
the years 2005 to 2012 (Figure 3-2). 
Figure 3-2 Residential Mortgage Market in China 
 
Note: This is from The People's Bank of China. The left Y-axis measures the ratio of 
mortgages to total bank loans, while the right Y-axis measures the total mortgage 
outstanding in billion Chinese Yuan. The X-axis indicates the year.  
 
Four commercial banks mainly issue residential mortgage loans in China: 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank 
(CCB), Bank of China (BOC) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). China 
Construction Bank (CCB) was the first bank to issue residential mortgage 
loans in China. Several distinctive features of China residential mortgage 
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3.2.1 Borrowing Requirements 
Borrowers should have a stable source of income and a good credit record, and 
be between 18 to 65 years of age. Generally, the loan-to-value ratio should be 
lower than 30%, and the term of the loan should be less than 30 years. To 
apply for a mortgage loan, applicants should provide a real estate certificate or 
purchase contract and proof of down payment from the developer, proof of 
income (this is the main document for housing mortgage loan applications in 
China), evidence of other types of property (such as another real estate 
certificate, stocks, funds, cash deposits, vehicle permits, etc.). According to 
the requirements announced by the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) in the 2004 "Guidelines for the risk management of real estate loans 
of commercial banks", the ratio of monthly mortgage payments to income for 
borrowers should be lower than 50%, and the ratio of total monthly debt 
payment to income should be lower than 55%. 
3.2.2 The Scope of Collateral 
In China, the collateral for mortgages can only be houses. This includes villas, 
with the down-payment ratio for a villa being higher than that for other types 
of houses. The age of the house (from the housing completion date) usually 
should be no more than 20 to 30 years, and the sum of the age of the house 
and the loan term should be no more than 30 to 40 years. In other countries, 
such as US, the collateral of a mortgage can belong to the borrower or others. 
If the collateral belongs to others, the mortgagor must get the permission and 
signature of the property owner and their spouses. However, in China, the 
collateral of a mortgage can only belong to the borrower himself. 
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3.2.3 Loan Application Procedure 
Applicants should first submit the required documents. After receiving the 
application form filled by the applicant together with the relevant documents, 
the bank carries out eligibility investigations. The most important factor for 
the bank to investigate is the income statement and credit record. Individual 
credit records can be checked by the rating system of the People's Bank of 
China. This rating system was on trial in December 2004, and began running 
officially from January 2006. Upon approval, the bank and the borrower sign a 
mortgage contract. The borrower then opens a mortgage account at the 
mortgage bank for making mortgage payments. Every month, the borrower 
makes a specified payment to the bank according to the mortgage contract. 
3.2.4 Mortgage Interest Rate 
In China, the mortgage interest rate is regulated by the central bank of China, 
known as the People’s Bank of China. Interest rates determined by the 
People's Bank of China can be executed by commercial banks after approval 
by the State Council. All banks are expected to follow the lending rules set by 
the People’s Bank of China. According to the People's Bank of China’s 
regulations, the mortgage interest rate should be a multiple of the benchmark 
lending rate. Before August 2006, the multiple was 0.9; from August 2006 to 
October 2008, the multiple was 0.85; from October 2008 to March 2010, the 
multiple was 0.7; after March 2010, the multiple was 0.85 for the first house, 
and 1.1 for the second house. In addition, before 2010, the real mortgage 
interest rate was the lowest interest rate regulated by the People's Bank of 
China. However, since 2011, because of the reach of credit risk measurement 
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techniques and other tools of banks, mortgage interest rates higher than the 
lowest interest rates regulated by the People's Bank of China started to 
increase. Currently, the benchmark lending interest rate is 5.6% for mortgage 
loans with a term of 6 months or below. For loans with a term above 5 years, 
the benchmark lending interest rate is 6.55%. The spread between long term 
and short term is 95 basis points. 
One special feature of Chinese mortgage loans is that all loans in the current 
market are adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), and there are no fixed rate 
mortgages (FIX).  Some commercial banks issued a few fixed rate mortgages 
during 2007 to 2008, but these disappeared in a very short time. During the 
mortgage payment term, if the People’s Bank of China changes the interest 
rate, the interest rates of all mortgage loans will be adjusted according to the 
new interest rate. A few mortgage loans are adjusted in the next month or next 
quarter, while the majority of mortgage loans will be adjusted on the first day 
of the next year. Figure 3-3 shows the lending interest rates announced by the 
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Figure 3-3 Lending Rates in China 
 
Note: This is from The People's Bank of China. In China, mortgage interest rates are 
determined by the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China. All banks 
follow the lending rules that it sets. 6m: six months; 12m: twelve months or one year; 
1y: one year; 3y: three years; 5y: five years. 
 
3.2.5 Payment Method 
If the loan term is one year or less, both principal and interest must be repaid 
as a lump sum at maturity. If the loan term is greater than a year, the loan may 
be repaid in equal instalments of the principal plus interest, or in equal 
instalments of the principal. The borrower may choose either method, but 
there is only one payment method for each loan, and after the method has been 
specified in the contract, it may not be changed. Loan applications state that 
once a mortgage contract has been signed, borrowers should open a mortgage 
account at the mortgage bank for making mortgage payments. Borrowers 
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mortgage contract. Each month, borrowers can choose different payment 
decisions on their mortgage: continue paying, default on their payments, make 
a full prepayment, or make a partial prepayment.  
3.2.6 Mortgage Termination 
Default and full prepayment are two channels for terminating a mortgage 
contact during the mortgage’s term. There are very few defaults in China. 
Besides the potential cultural reasons, one main reason for this is that, unlike 
the United States, all mortgage loans in China are recourse loans. This allows 
mortgage lenders or banks to recover their loan losses from the borrowers’ 
assets. Thus, once a borrower defaults, all of his/her assets will be taken away 
to cover the loss of the mortgage lenders.  
Full prepayment and partial prepayment are very popular in China. The 
motivation for making a full prepayment in China is quite different from doing 
so in the United States because of the unique way in which mortgage interest 
rates are set: once the People’s Bank of China announces a rate change, all 
mortgage interest will be adjusted according to the change, and all banks use 
the same lending rate benchmark. Hence, all prepayments observed in the 
sample are payoffs or partial prepayments rather than refinances. In China, 




                                                          
18
 Refinancing is the process of paying off an existing loan by taking a new loan and 
using the same property as security. This is not allowed in China. 
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3.3 Relationship to the Prior Literature 
This chapter adds to several strands of the existing literature. First, there is a 
large volume of literature on the risk of mortgage lending and the termination 
behavior of borrowers in the United States. Pioneered by Asay (1978), there 
was a quick expansion of studies on mortgage valuation and borrower 
behavior based on contingent claims models, mainly developed by Black and 
Scholes (1973), Merton (1973a), and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). The 
contingent claims model provides a useful framework for analyzing borrowers’ 
termination behavior: prepayments are treated as an American call option and 
default as a compound put option. Most studies use option models to explain 
borrowers’ termination behavior, whether they do so using a full prepayment 
or by defaulting on their payments, or by doing both. There are a few studies 
on partial prepayment behavior. For instance, Dunn and McConnell (1981b) 
modelled the optimal full prepayment strategy of a mortgage holder, where 
full prepayment was regarded as a call option. Buser and Hendershott (1984), 
and Brennan and Schwartz (1985) also used option models to price the risk of 
full prepayment. Schwartz and Torous (1989) empirically modelled 
prepayment as a function of exogenous or explanatory variables in a 
regression model.  
Some other researchers use option theory to explain default 
behavior. Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) used the option approach to 
derive mortgage default insurance premiums using a sample of FHA loans, 
with mortgage default treated as a put option. Titman and Torous (1989), and 
Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) applied option models to mortgage defaults, 
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and concluded that well-informed borrowers will default immediately when 
the mortgage value exceeds the property value at any time during the loan 
term. However, Foster and Van Order (1984) noted that borrowers would not 
default “ruthlessly”, and exercised the put option of default if the value of 
house fell below the mortgage value by an amount equal to the net transaction 
costs. Therefore, the argument that transaction costs matter in mortgage 
default is important (Cunningham and Hendershott 1984; Foster and Van 
Order 1984, 1985; Vandell and Thibodeau 1985; Quigley and Van Order 1991; 
Lekkas, Quigley, and Van Order 1993).  
A series of papers provide support to emphasize the importance of the 
relationship between full prepayment and default options (Titman and Torous 
1989; Kau et al. 1992). Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996) and Deng (1997) 
were the first to model residential mortgage prepayments and defaults as a 
joint decision using micro-level data. Deng et al. (2000) modelled residential 
mortgage prepayments and defaults as competing risks, and considered the 
issue of unobserved heterogeneity in the context of hazard modelling. 
However, few studies pay attention to partial prepayment risk and the 
corresponding behavior of borrowers. 
In addition, there is limited literature on China’s mortgage markets, as it has 
been impeded by data limitations. Deng, Zheng, and Ling (2005) was the first 
rigorous empirical work to study the risk of residential mortgage markets in 
China, noting that while the option theory failed to explain prepayment and 
default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, the behavior 
could be explained by other financial factors that were unrelated to option 
theory. The same authors also found that borrower characteristics were 
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significant in determining borrowers’ prepayment behavior, and may thus be 
used as an effective tool for screening potential high-risk borrowers in the loan 
origination process. Deng and Liu (2009) studied the termination risk of 
mortgages in the Chinese housing market by using embedded forward 
contracts. They found that borrower characteristics and collateral information 
are both important in determining mortgage termination risks in China. 
Overall, very few papers study the Chinese mortgage markets, and this chapter 
addresses this gap to improve our understanding of Chinese mortgage markets. 
This chapter also adds to literature on reinforcement learning, which has been 
extensively addressed both in psychology and behavioral economics. In 
psychology, Bush and Mosteller (1955) proposed the ﬁrst mathematical model 
of reinforcement learning. The Bush-Mosteller model was later adapted and 
generalized in economics by Cross (1973), Arthur (1991, 1993), Roth and 
Erev (1995), and Erev and Roth (1998). However, many economic studies 
have analyzed learning in laboratory environments. Due to data limitations, 
only a few studies have measured learning with household-level data. For 
example, Miravete (2003) and Agarwal et al. (2006) respectively showed that 
consumers switch telephone calling plans and credit card contracts to 
minimize monthly bill payments. Other researchers have shown the predictive 
power of learning models.  For example, Ho and Chong (2003) used grocery 
store scanner data to estimate a model in which consumers accumulate not 
only product-level experience but also attribute-level experience, and they 
learn from these experiences to make decisions. Agarwal et al. (2006) studied 
the learning process in credit card market, and indicated that the speed of net 
learning was about twice as great for higher-income borrowers than it was for 
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lower income borrowers. At the same time, the rate of knowledge depreciation, 
or forgetting, was about half as fast for high-relative to low-income borrowers. 
Middle-aged borrowers have the same advantageous learning dynamics 
relative to older borrowers. Haselhuhn et al. (2012) studied video stores, and 
found that renters were more likely to return their videos on time if they had 
recently been ﬁned for returning them late. In this chapter, individual loan-
level data is used to test for the existence of learning in the mortgage market. 
This study will provide evidence for the role of learning in explaining the 
partial prepayment behavior in the mortgage market. 
3.4 The Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Empirical Methodology 
Following Axel (1990), in the empirical analysis of this chapter, a conditional 
fixed effects multinomial logit model (FEMNL) is employed to examine the 
partial prepayment behavior of mortgage borrowers and their learning process. 
In the FEMNL model, the choice probabilities of borrowers are conditional on 
their past learning experiences and have the same convenient multinomial 
logit form as their unconditional choice probabilities.  
Let        denote the probability that household n, n=1, …, N, makes 
decisions on its mortgage payments: ‘d’ (default), ‘p’  (full prepayment), ‘c’  
(continue to pay) and ‘i’  (partial prepayment), in period t, t=1, …, T. The 
choice of each payment decision is determined by a vector of explanatory 
variables which vary by each borrower, time, and loan,     , and a learning 
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factor for each borrower   . The learning factor    consists of a self-learning 
factor and a factor to measure learning from others, where: 
                                                     ∑          
        
 
    {
                                   
                                                          
 
For self-learning,     is a sufficient statistic and can be observed from the data. 
In addition to self-learning, borrowers can also learn from others. The 




Algebraically, conditioning on the    , yields the following conditional choice 
probabilities for the nth borrower's sequence of choices over time, denoted by 
               (Chamberlain 1980): 
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 Learning from others is shown here, which is similar in form to learning from self, 
where: 
         ∑            
   
 
    {
                                    
                                                              
 
Borrower (-n) represents all other borrowers around borrower n, and borrower n can 
learn from them (-n). In the empirical work, borrower (-n) and borrower (n) are from 
the same company. 
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Where the borrower and time varying explanatory variables,      mainly 
include three groups information: borrowers’ characteristics   , loan 
information   , and intrinsic values of the default and prepayment options   . 
The set    represents the set of all choice sequences that result in the same 
“aggregate choice pattern”    (               ) of the household: 
             
 {                        |          ∑      ∑       
  
} 
The choice probabilities in Equation (3.2) are multinomial logit choice 
probabilities conditional on choice set    that varies by household. The 
resulting conditional loglikelihood function is:  
                                         ∑           |   
   
 
It needs to be accumulated only over the set C that includes all borrowers that 
have chosen mortgage partial prepayment at least once: 
                                  {       |             } 
and can be estimated with conventional logit packages. 
The coefficients   in the FEMNL model have the same interpretation as the in 
the conventional logit model and can be used to calculate choice elasticities 
with respect to the kth explanatory variable: 
                          
                  
    ⁄    
  (        )  
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where the omission of the borrower index n and the time index t refers to the 
mean across all borrowers and all time periods, and       if and only if i=j. 
3.4.2 Data Collection 
The empirical analysis is based on a unique individual mortgage dataset with 
loan history information collected by a major residential mortgage lender in 
China. The dataset contains a large number of mortgage observations and 
monthly payment events on single family mortgage loans in 35 major cities in 
China issued from 2003 to 2010. All loans are adjustable rate mortgage loans. 
For each loan, the available information includes static information taken at 
the time of origination, such as the mortgage date, the original loan amount, 
the initial loan-to-value ratio, the mortgage contract interest rate, term, and the 
province and city in which the property is located. The data also include 
dynamic data on monthly payments, mortgage balances, and indictor of full 
prepayment, partial prepayment, and default. Besides loan information, the 
dataset also provides valuable information about borrowers’ characteristics, 
including monthly income, age, gender, marriage status, education, occupation, 
job position and houses and mortgages they currently have. The regression 
data used in this chapter is based upon 172,328 mortgages loans with 
5,282,182 monthly payment events. 
3.4.3 Regression Variables  
Table 3-1 provides a concise summary of all the regression variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Some key variables and their derivations are discussed 
below. 
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Table 3–1 Regression Variables Description 
Note: This table presents the regression variables in this chapter. Besides loan and 
borrower characteristics, the most important variables in this chapter are ‘Self-
Learning Factor’ and ‘Factor of Learn from Others’, and their definitions can be 
found in the following discussion.  
 
Variables  Definition and Description  
Woodheads Factor Following Deng and Quigly (2012), the woodheads factor 
in this chapter reflects difference in “astuteness’ among 
borrowers’ investment choice. This factor can be viewed 
as a correlate of the unobserved heterogeneity of 
individual borrowers.  
Self-Learning Factor This reflects the learning borrowers gain from their own 
experiences. It can be calculated from Equation 3.1.  
Learning from Others This reflects the learning borrowers’ gain from the 
experiences of others. It can be calculated from 
footnote19.  
Option Variables:  
Call option Call options are different in China compared to the US. 
This difference is an outcome of the probability of 
negative interest rate, and reflects investment opportunity 
costs in China.  
Put option Probability of negative equity at termination or censored.  
No. of House and Mortgage Loan Possessed: 
2 houses and 1 mortgage Borrower with 2 houses and 1 mortgage (1=Y). 
2 houses and 2 mortgage Borrower with 2 houses and 2 mortgage (1=Y). 
Education:  
Graduate and above Borrower’s education level is graduate and above (1=Y). 
Income:  
Log monthly income The logarithm of borrower’s monthly income 
With Other Income more 
than 10,000  
Whether the borrower has other annual income more than 
10,000 Chinese Yuan (1=Y), in addition to his/her regular 
monthly income. 
Age>=40 Borrower is older than 40 (1=Y) 
First house 
 
This is the first house that borrowers have brought and 
are using as collateral (1=Y).  
Married Borrower’s marriage status (1=Y) 
With Zhi Cheng ‘Zhi Cheng’ refers to the level of professional’s ability 
and professional achievement. In China, Zhi Cheng 
includes five levels: Senior, Associate senior, 
intermediate, assistant, technician level (1=Y). 
Male Borrower is male (1=Y) 
Dependent Dependent number of borrower 
LTV Loan to value ratio 
Log loan amount The logarithm of loan amount 
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The variables ‘Number of House and Mortgage loans possessed’ indicates the 
extent of payment pressure that borrowers face. The term ‘Borrower with 2 
houses and 1 mortgage’ refers to those who have two houses, where one is 
financed with a mortgage and the other is fully owned. They can rent out one 
of their houses to relieve their mortgage pressure. Borrowers with 2 houses 
and 1 mortgage face a lower level of payment pressure than those with 1 house 
and 1 mortgage. The level of payment pressure for borrowers with 2 houses 
and 2 mortgages should be lower than the payment pressure for those with 1 
house and 1 mortgage, but higher than those with 2 houses and 1 mortgage. 
a) Option variables  
Since the early works of Dunn and McConnell (1981) and Green and Shoven 
(1986), researchers have modelled mortgage contracts in a contingent claims 
framework: a borrower’s option to prepay the mortgage is an embedded call 
option at a strike price of par while the default option is a put option at a strike 
price equal to the market value of the collateral property. In the United States, 
there are two primary motivations for borrowers to exercise their call option: 
(1) to refinance their existing debt at a lower rate of interest; or (2) to 
terminate their debt through sale of the underlying asset.
20
 If the current 
market value of the house, which serves as collateral of the mortgage debt, 
drops below the current value of the remaining mortgage balance, a borrower 
has an incentive to default. In the absence of transaction costs, a rational 
borrower can maximize his/her welfare by exercising the options when they 
are “in the money”. 
                                                          
20
 Borrowers may sell their house for various reasons such as relocation for work and 
changes in family circumstances. 
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As discussed above, the special features of Chinese mortgage contracts have to 
be taken into account when calculating the option values. In China, the 
mortgage interest rate is regulated by the People’s Bank of China. All changes 
in this rate are subject to changes in the lending rates published by the 
People’s Bank of China. In addition, refinancing is not allowed in China. 
Based on these considerations, the value of the call option is calculated 
differently in China than the US. In this chapter, the calculation of the call 
option follows Deng and Liu (2008), where the prepayment option does not 
depend on the interest rate, but is instead closely related to the borrower's 
alternative investment set. 
Mortgage debt is treated as a consumption smoothing instrument. There are 
very few investment opportunities and very few borrowing vehicles in the 
current Chinese capital market. The mortgage market is a major and steadily 
growing sector in the Chinese debt market while the stock market is the major 
investment sector. Therefore, borrowers will make prepayment decisions 
based on the cost of capital and stock market returns. They will prepay when 
the cost of capital (mortgage rate) exceeds the investment returns. Figure 3-4 
shows the stock index return in China from 2003 to 2012. The optimal 
stopping time of prepayment depends on a borrower's income and his/her 
judgment about stock market returns and interest rates in the future. If 
borrowers are in the same circumstances, i.e. they have same income flow, 
same information, same perceptions of the macro economy, and the same level 
of risk aversion, they will make prepayments. 
 




Figure 3-4 Stock Index in Shanghai Exchange of China 
 
Note: The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index is a capitalization-weighted 
index. The index tracks the daily price performance of all A-shares and B-shares 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The index was developed on December 19, 
1990 with a base value of 100. Index trade volume on Q is scaled down by a factor of 
1000. 
 
The “put option” in this chapter is measured by the probability of negative 
equity, and the calculation follows Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000). The 
put option can be calculated as: 
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where     is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,      
  is the 
current market value of mortgage debt and      is the current market value of 
the property i.    is housing index volatility. The current market value of 
mortgage debt is calculated using the current interest rate and monthly 
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where M is monthly payment of mortgage principle and interest,      is 
adjustable mortgage rate for loan originated at time τ and after the seasoning 
period of k. T is the mortgage term. 
The current market value of property is calculated as: 
                                                   
      





with LTV is the original loan-to-value ratio which is indicated in the database, 
   is the housing price index.  
The intrinsic value of the call option is: 
                                                
     
    
     
  
where      
  is defined the same way as in  the “put option”, as the current 
market value of the mortgage, that is, the cost of financing a house purchase, 
and    is the value of a hypothetical income, that is, the return from an 
alternative investment. Since the stock market is a major investment 
alternative, the Shanghai stock price index is used in calculating the return of 
the investment. Specifically,    is defined as: 
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where     is, as previously stated, is monthly payment of mortgage principle  
and interest.    is the risk free interest rate. In this chapter, the risk free rate is 
represented by the basic lending rate from the People’s Bank of China.  
b) Self-Learning Factor  
The calculation for the self-learning factor can be found in Equation 3.1. In the 
data, it can be observed that the number of times borrowers have partially 
prepaid their mortgages before the current decision time each month since 
origination. Then, the self-learning factor for each borrower at each time 
period can be computed, reflecting how often he/she has chosen to make a 
partial prepayment in the past. It is a time-varying variable. Self-learning is 
expected to have an effect on the likelihood of partial prepayment: the 
probability that a borrower will make a partial prepayment in the future 
positively depends on the number of partial prepayments he/she has made 
previously. Therefore, borrowers who have made more partial prepayments in 
the earlier stages of their mortgage will be more likely to continue making 
partial prepayments in the future.  
c) Learning From Others  
The calculation of the impact of learning from others is specified in footnote 
19. The dataset records the company identification numbers of the workplaces 
of the borrowers. An assumption is made that borrowers from the same 
company will interact with and learn from each other. For each month since 
the origination of a loan, the number of times all other borrowers from the 
same company made a partial prepayment on their mortgages in previous time 
periods before the current decision time can be observed. Therefore, the 




impact of learning from others is computed as the total number of times that 
all other borrowers from the same company made partial prepayments before 
the current time period. Just like the self-learning factor, it is a time-varying 
variable. The expected effect of learning from others on the partial prepayment 
decision is: the probability that borrowers will make partial prepayments in the 
future is positively related to the earlier partial prepayment experiences of 
their peers in the firm where they work. Thus, the probability that borrower A 
will make a partial prepayment is higher if more people from his/her 
workplace have been making partially prepayments. 
d) Woodheads Factor 
In the mortgage market, some correlates of unobserved heterogeneity of 
individual borrowers are observed in the data, and a woodheads factor was 
created to reflect differences in “astuteness’ among borrowers (see Deng and 
Quigly 2012). The woodheads factor in Deng and Quigly (2012) is similar to 
the burnout effect, which reflects how pools of mortgage loans which have 
experienced large exposure to reﬁnancing opportunities tend to have lower 
prepayment rates, other things being equal. Each month since origination, the 
call option’s status (that is, whether it is in the money) is calculated. Then the 
woodheads factor for each borrower is computed: it reflects the number of 
months since origination that an in-the-money call option was not exercised by 
partial prepayment. However, the woodheads factor in this essay is different 
from that of Deng and Quigly (2012). The calculation of the value of the call 
option of borrowers in this essay is based on the cost of capital and the stock 
market return. In a perfect market, borrowers should choose investments with 
a higher return rate. Thus, the woodheads factor in this essay reflects 




difference in “astuteness” among borrowers’ investment choices, instead of 
refinancing opportunities. 
3.4.4 Descriptive Statistics   
Table 3-2 shows the basic statistics for the variables in the empirical model by 
loan characteristics (origination year, loan to value ratio, loan amount) and 
household characteristics (such as marriage status, gender, age, house owned 
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 The definition of “Zhicheng” is: the title of a technical or professional post (such as 
engineer, professor, lecturer, academician, etc.). It reflects their technological 
capability and work capacity. 




Table 3–2 Descriptive Statistics for Mortgage Loans 
-Frequency of Loans by Major Categorical Covariates 
Note: This table shows the basic statistics of regression variables in the empirical 
model by loan information and household characteristics. The definitions of the 
variables are shown in Table 3-1. 
 
Variables Loan Observations Percentage on 
Total Loans 
Origination Year   
2003 9,818  5.7 
2004 16,330 9.48 
2005 13,939 8.09 
2006 16,104 9.34 
2007 27,195 15.78 
2008 18,683 10.84 
2009 46,951 27.25 
2010 23,308 13.53 
Loan to Value Ratio   
LTV<=50 44,114 25.60 
50<LTV<=60 24,784 14.38 
60<LTV<=70 64,193 37.25 
70<LTV<=80 39,227 22.76 
Original Loan Amount (RMB)   
OLA=<200,000 59,528 34.54 
200,000 <OLA<400,000 60,867 35.32 
OLA >=400000 51,933 30.14 
Marital Status   
Married 103,660 60.15 
Single 68,668 39.85 
Gender   
Male 84,617 49.10 
Female 87,711 50.90 
No. of House and Mortgage Loan Possessed 
Borrower with2 houses and 1 mortgage 53,813 31.23 
Borrower with1 house and 1 mortgage 18,784 10.90 
2 houses and 2 mortgages 5,926 3.44 
Occupation    
Official 2,583 1.50 
Institution 9,921 5.76 
Professional 5,454 3.16 
Education   
Graduate and above 51,601 29.94 
Others 120,727 70.06 
Age   
Age>=40 34,806 20.20 
Age<40 137,522 79.80 
Zhi Cheng   
With Zhicheng 26,281 15.25 
Without Zhicheng 146,047 84.75 
Total Observations 172,328 100 




Table 3-3 shows the statistics for the woodheads factor, M, for mortgage loans 
and mortgage payment events. Panel A shows the distribution of M by 
mortgage loans, separately for the full sample and for differently seasoned 
mortgage pools.
22
 It can be seen that nearly 91% of the mortgage loans in the 
sample have missed at least one opportunity to invest in stock markets to earn 
a higher return rate. About 55.71% of borrowers in the two years’ seasoned 
pools have missed more than twelve opportunities, while for five years’ 
seasoned pools, the percentage is smaller at 44.06%.  The results for the 
payment events listed in the Panel B are calculated similarly to Panel A. It 
shows the distribution of M by payment events, separately for the full sample 
and for differently seasoned mortgage pools. Nearly 90% of payment events in 
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 The two year seasoned pool is a sub-sample of mortgage loans whose durations are 
greater than two years. The three and five years seasoned pools have a similar 
intuition, meaning the sub-sample of mortgage loans with durations greater than five 
years or ten years. As indicated in Deng and Quigley (2012), the full sample may be 
interpreted as a pool containing the newly issued mortgage loans, like duration year 
bigger than 0 but smaller than 3.  






























































Total 172,328 90,295 66,520 24,187 


















































5,282,182 4,189,545 3,500,003 1,601,934 
Note: Panel A presents the percentage distribution of M among mortgage loan pools. 
Panel B presents the same percentage statistics of Panel A for mortgage payable 
events.   
 
Figure 3-5 presents the cumulative frequency of M among mortgages in these 









Figure 3-5 Cumulative Frequency of Woodheads Factor 
 
 
Note: Panel A presents the cumulative frequency distribution of M among mortgage 

















A. Cumulative Frequency of Woodheads Factor of Mortgage 
Loans 
Full Sample 2-Year Seasoned Pool















B.Cumulative Frequency of Woodheads Factor of Payable 
Events 
Full Sample 2-Year Seasoned Pool
3-Year Seasoned Pool 5-Year Seasoned Pool




Table 3-4 lists the descriptive statistics for the learning factors: both ‘Self-
Learning Factor’ and ‘Factor of Learn from Others’. Panel A shows both the 
frequency and percentage for the self-learning factor. The learning times are 
calculated as the number of times the borrower has made partial prepayments 
before the current decision time. 92.48% of borrowers do not have any prior 
learning in the full sample. In contrast, 66.85% of the borrowers who do not 
have learning experiences are among those who chose partial prepayment. In 
other words, more of the individuals who have chosen partial prepayment have 
experience with making partial prepayments compared with the full sample. 
5.61% of the borrowers have had one-time learning experience in the total 
sample. In contrast, for borrowers who choose partial prepayment, 20.39% of 
them have had one-off learning experiences, which is much higher than the 
total sample. It is clear that the partial prepayment experiences of borrowers 
who choose partial prepayments in the earlier stages are more than the total 
sample. Panel B shows both the frequency and percentage of factor of learning 













Table 3–4 Descriptive Statistics of Learning Factors 







































































































Total  5,282,182 28,972 Total 5,282,182 28,972 
Note: The learning times are calculated as the total partial prepayment frequencies of 
the borrower has been made in the earlier stage before current decision time. 
 
3.4.5 Results 
A conditional fixed effects multinomial logit model (FEMNL) is employed to 
study the risk of mortgage partial prepayments and the process during which 
mortgage borrowers learn to make partial prepayment decisions in the 
residential mortgage market in China. Model 1 to Model 3 in Table 3-5 report 
the regression coefficients and odds ratios in the full sample analysis for 
partial prepayment choice.  




Model 1 is the basic regression with option variables, loan information and 
borrower characteristics variables. The results show that financial motivation 
is still important in generating a borrower’s partial prepayment decision. The 
‘call option’ is positive and significant, which shows that the alternative 
investment opportunities, such as stock market investments, are important in 
explaining a borrower’s partial prepayment behavior. For borrowers with two 
houses and one mortgage, the probability of partial prepayments is higher, the 
reason being that the pressure they face to make mortgage payments is lower 
than that faced by borrowers with one house and one mortgage. Borrowers 
with a graduate degree and above make partial prepayments more often. 
Monthly income has a negative effect on partial prepayment behavior, 
possibly because those with higher incomes have greater investment 
opportunities and they will choose the most profitable one. In China, 
according to the regulations of lending banks, the minimum amount of partial 
prepayment is 10,000 Chinese Yuan each time. Borrowers with other income 
greater than 10,000 Chinese Yuan are less likely to make partial prepayments. 
The explanation is similar to that of monthly income. The probability of old 
people to make partial prepayment is lower than young people. Moreover, 
borrowers with a mortgage on the first house are less likely to make partial 
prepayments during the payment term. Male borrowers are less likely to 
partially prepay. In addition, it is easier for mortgage loans with higher loan 
amounts to be partially prepaid by borrowers. In contrast to the loan quantum, 
the relationship between loan to value ratio and the probability of partial 
prepayments is negative. Comparing the results for loan quantum and loan to 




value ratio, it can be inferred that large loan amounts are accompanied by 
large housing values instead of higher loan to value ratios.  
Model 2 extends Model 1 by adding a woodheads factor into the model, 
similar to Deng and Quigley’s (2012) prepayment model. The woodheads 
factor M is very significant in accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in this 
way, increases the magnitude of the option-related variables, and improves the 
model fit. The negative relationship between M and the probability of partial 
prepayments indicates that with more missed partial prepayment opportunities 
(larger M), the probability of making partial prepayments is lower. This is 
consistent with the burnout effect, which states that sensitive borrowers make 
partial prepayments as soon as possible, and only the least sensitive borrowers 
remain in the pool while partial prepayment rates decay.  
Model 3 extends Model 2 by adding the ‘self-learning factor’ into the model. 
The ‘self-learning factor’ is positive and significant after controlling for other 
loan and borrower characteristics and the woodheads factor. This ‘self-
learning factor’ is indicative of a borrower’s earlier partial prepayment 
experiences. The positive relationship between ‘self-learning factor’ and the 
possibility of partial prepayment indicates that path dependency exists, since a 
borrower’s partial prepayment decision depends not only upon current stage 
variables (like other investment opportunities), but also the learning 
experience of the path. The probability that borrowers with more partial 
prepayment experiences at earlier stages will make the same decision in the 
future increases by 26.9 percentage points. 
 




Table 3–5 Self-Learning and Mortgage Partial Prepayment Decisions 
Variables Model1 Model2 Model 3 






Self-Learning Factor   0.228*** 
(0.002) 
[1.269] 















































































































































Note: The data is panel dataset, with one observation for each month for each loan 
during the observation period. The final sample includes 5,207,421 monthly payment 
events for 172, 328 loans. Multinomial logistic regression is estimated for default, full 
prepayment and partial prepayment. The results reported here are for partial 
prepayment. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 2-1. 
City and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the estimated odds ratios for 
Multinomial Logit regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3-6 shows the regression results of learning from others and prior 
mortgage partial prepayment decisions. Compared to Table 3-5, one factor 
named “Learning from Others” is added into the model. The definition of this 
variable can be found in the previous section. The coefficients for both the 
self-learning and the learning from others factor are positive and significant, 
after controlling for other loan and borrower characteristics and the 
woodheads factor. For borrowers who learn from their own experiences in 
earlier stages, the probability that they will make the same decision in the 
future increases by 26.2 percentage points. The probability that borrowers 
who learn from the experiences of others in earlier stages will make the same 
decision in the future increased 1.8 percentage points. For the factor of 
learning from others, this positive relationship can be explained as such: 
borrowers can learn from their colleagues or friends from the same company. 
The more colleagues or friends who have partially prepaid in the past, the 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Spatial Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 5,207,421 5,207,421 5,207,421 
AIC 723012.83 723372.59 703150.00 
SC 725315.45 725675.21   705816.19 
-2 Log Likelihood 722670.83 723030.59 702754.00 




higher the probability that borrowers choose to partial prepay on their own 
mortgage. 
Table 3–6 Learn from Others and Mortgage Partial Prepayment Decisions 
Variables Model 4 
Woodheads Factor -0.170*** 
(0.010) 
[0.844] 
Self-Learning Factor 0.233*** 
(0.002) 
[1.262] 
 Learning From Others 0.017*** 
(0.003) 
[1.018] 
Call option 0.107*** 
(0.007) 
[1.113] 
Put option -0.076*** 
(0.006) 
[0.927] 
2 houses and 1 mortgage 0.022*** 
(0.008) 
[1.022] 
2 houses and 2 mortgages -0.041*** 
(0.007) 
[0.960] 
Graduate and above 0.130*** 
(0.006) 
[1.138] 
Log monthly income -0.147*** 
(0.006) 
[0.863] 
























Note: The data is panel dataset, with one observation for each month for each loan 
during the observation period. The final sample includes 5,207,421 monthly payment 
events for 172, 328 loans. Multinomial logistic regression is estimated for default, full 
prepayment and partial prepayment. The results reported here are for partial 
prepayment. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 3-1. 
City and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression but not reported. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and the estimated odds ratios for 
Multinomial Logit regression are reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Recent experience may play a larger role than old experience in determining 
behavior. Here, the results of the recency effect for self-learning are listed 
next. Table 3-7 shows the regression for recency effect and mortgage partial 
prepayment behavior. Only those who have been partial prepaid on their own 
mortgages at least once are selected. A factor termed ‘Self-Learning Duration’ 
is added into the model. It calculated as the duration between current time and 
the time of latest partial prepayment decision.If the ‘Self-Learning Duration’ is 
large, then the partial prepayment experience is older, and vice versa. If the 
recency effect exists, we would expect a negative relationship between ‘Self-







Log loan amount 0.307*** 
(0.008) 
[1.360] 
Year Fixed Effects Y 




-2 Log Likelihood 714016.42 




words, partial prepayment probability would be smaller as the time from the 
previous partial prepayment decision to current time is longer. From Table 3-7, 
it can be seen that the ‘Self-Learning Duration’ is negatively and significantly 
related to partial prepayment probability as expected.  
Table 3–7 Recency Effect and Mortgage Partial Prepayment Decisions 
Variables Model 5 
Woodheads Factor -0.152*** 
(0.011) 
[0.863] 
Self-Learning Factor 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
[1.023] 
 Learning From Others 0.014** 
(0.006) 
[1.014] 
Self-Learning Learning Duration -0.676*** 
(0.013) 
[0.509] 
Call option 0.078*** 
(0.007) 
[1.080] 
Put option -0.102*** 
(0.007) 
[0.903] 
2 houses and 1 mortgage 0.026*** 
(0.008) 
[1.025] 
2 houses and 2 mortgages 0.003 
(0.006) 
[1.003] 
Graduate and above 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
[1.018] 
Log monthly income -0.024*** 
(0.007) 
[0.975] 


















Note: Only loans which have been partially prepaid are included. The data is panel 
dataset, with one observation for each month for each loan during the observation 
period. The final sample includes 759,152 month payment events. Multinomial 
logistic regression is estimated for default, full prepayment and partial prepayment. 
The results reported here are for partial prepayment. The definitions of the 
independent variables are shown in Table 3-1. City and origination year fixed effects 
are included in the regression but not reported. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and the estimated odds ratios for Multinomial Logit regression are 
reported in brackets.  
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.4.6 Alternative Argument 
The previous sections have documented that the probability of partial 
prepayments is explained by the learning process. However, there is an 
alternative argument: mortgage borrowers in China choose to make partial 
prepayments on their mortgage loans when they have earnings surprises (extra 
income). This would mean that past experience in making partial prepayments 












Log loan amount 0.123*** 
(0.009) 
[1.131] 
Year Fixed Effects Y 
Spatial Fixed Effects Y 
Observations 759,152 
AIC 292258.63 
SC 294335.82    
-2 Log Likelihood 291898.63    




may simply be a proxy of the likelihood that the borrower has received extra 
income. Being in the same company as someone else who has partial 
prepayment experience can be another proxy of that likelihood – borrowers 
working in the same company have a good chance of receiving bonuses at the 
same time. Therefore, it is important to distinguish such ‘earning surprises’ 
from the learning experience. 
The results of the recency effect shown in Table 3-7 can help to respond to 
this alternative argument. Following the extra income argument, if the ‘Self-
Learning Duration’ is large, then the probability of getting extra income is 
high, and the probability of mortgage partial prepayments is high (positive 
effect). However, the results are in the opposite direction. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies the risk of partial prepayment and the reinforcement 
learning process of borrowers’ partial prepayment behavior in the Chinese 
mortgage market. The results indicate that the risk of partial prepayment is 
different from the full prepayment risk. Borrowers’ partial prepayment 
behavior follows the reinforcement learning process.  
The residential mortgage market in China is an important financial engine for 
the booming housing market. As the Chinese mortgage market is very 
different from that of the US, especially in terms of the motivation to make 
prepayments and the calculation of call options, the option theory is not 
applicable in predicting the risk of partial prepayments in China. Since the 
stock market provides a higher return on investment in the capital market for 




Chinese households, fluctuations in the stock market have a more significant 
impact on the probability that borrowers will terminate their mortgages, 
especially by making prepayments.  
The characteristics of borrowers have a significant impact on their propensity 
to make partial prepayments, and thus may useful for screening loan 
applicants and determining potential high-risk borrowers. The results in this 
chapter also indicate that the partial prepayment behavior of borrowers is path-
dependent and follows a reinforcement learning process. The partial 
prepayment decision depends not only upon current stage variables and 
borrowers’ characteristics, but also learning experiences, both from their own 
experiences and from others). Borrowers who have made more partial 
prepayments early on are more likely to continue making partial prepayments 
compared to those who have less experience with making them. In addition, 




Chapter 4 Predicting Default of Chinese 
Companies: Information beyond Accounting and 
Market Variables 
4.1 Introduction 
Predicting the default risk of corporations is a widely-studied issue that is 
critical for credit risk management, macroeconomic policy-making and 
financial regulation. Assessing which variables are relevant in predicting the 
default risk of firms is an important issue, not only to providers of capital, but 
to academics and economists as well. However, it is a challenging task. This is 
especially true for developing countries where the quality of information is 
poor. This chapter builds default probability prediction models for Chinese 
companies that address this information quality issue.  
In studies in the United States, discriminant analysis using accounting ratios 
has long proven to be a useful tool for predicting corporate bankruptcy 
(Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Zmijewski 1984; Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie 
2005; Altman 2012). The accounting data is derived from the firm’s operating 
environment, and includes variables such as firm size, book-to-market equity 
ratio, and its rate of growth. The rationale for this approach is that historical 
accounting information is a good predictor of firms’ future insolvency. 




Recently, researchers have suggested that market-driven variables derived 
from a firm’s information and trading environments be used instead of 
accounting ratios to predict corporate bankruptcy. They argue that the 
probability of a firm entering default should be perfectly reflected at all times 
in the market value of its equity (Chava and Jarrow 2004; Hillegeist et al. 
2004). If efficient market prices reflect the full forward-looking information of 
a firm’s performance and thus its likelihood to enter bankruptcy, accounting-
based variables should not contain any information that is not reflected in the 
market price of a company. Several studies have tried to combine these two 
approaches to predict corporate default (Shumway 2001; Campbell, Jens, and 
Jan 2008). 
However, in the context of developing countries, information quality becomes 
a potential issue when either the accounting-based model or the market-driven 
model is used to predict corporate default. First, accounting and legal 
standards in developing countries are often less stringent and detailed than 
those in developed countries. In their study on the different level of protection 
investors received from capital markets in various countries, La-Porta et al. 
(1997) found that poor accounting and legal standards were a reflection of the 
size and maturity of a country’s capital markets. Developing countries, 
including some in Asia, provide investors with less protection, and have 
weaker capital markets than those with good legal environments. Secondly, as 
mentioned in Shleifer (1994): “Politicians can shut down a business, kick it 
out of its premises, or even refuse to allow it to start”. This institutional effect 
in developing counties cannot be overlooked. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) 




showed that institutional effects played a unique role in several Asian markets, 
leading stock prices to be less informative in these markets.  
As a leading emerging economy, China has witnessed all of the concerns 
raised above. Thus, using accounting and market variables to predict the 
default probability of Chinese-listed companies is an urgent question. China 
has a unique corporate environment where a large proportion of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) exist and have significant roles in the market. SOEs are 
usually alleged to make distorted production and operation decisions because 
of a mixture of poor governance, under-developed management skills, and 
heavy “policy burdens” to fulfil government policy agendas (Lin and Tan 
1999; Lin and Li 2008). However, SOEs and other companies with a high 
level of state ownership also have privileged access to inputs, capital, and 
markets which have a positive effect on their performances. More importantly, 
these companies usually have extended social capital, such as bank lending 
relationships, government support, and subsidies. What is the impact of these 
factors on corporate default? This chapter is especially interested in the impact 
of state ownership on company default after controlling for variations in 
observable firm financial performances measured by firm-level accounting 
and market variables.   
Figure 4-1 shows the share of SOEs in different industrial sectors, both by 
numbers of enterprise and total assets. There is a substantial gap between these 
two lines, indicating that even though there are only a few SOEs, their total 
asset are much larger than non-SOEs. Again, the data suggests that the average 
size of SOEs is much bigger than non-SOEs. In 2000, even though SOEs were 




less than 40% of the total number of enterprises, they accounted for more than 
70% of total assets. Moreover, SOEs’ share of industry has declined 
enormously; their shrinking share in the industrial sector both in terms of the 
number of enterprises and total assets is also evidenced in Figure 4-1. This is 
due to the stronger growth of non-SOEs as the economy has developed. 
Figure 4-1 Share of SOEs in the Industry Sector 
 
Note: From National Bureau of Statistics. The Y-axis measures the percentage, while 
the X-axis indicates the year. 
 
The significance of macroeconomic variables in default prediction is the third 
issue which being investigated in this chapter. Nichell, Perraudin, and Varotto 
(2000) and Bangia et al. (2002) showed that changes in ratings in the US were 
affected by the state of the economy. However, the usefulness of 
macroeconomic variables for assessing default is not limited to their impact on 
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interdependence of firms and the potential contagion of default risk may cause 
the default risk of individual firms to exceed the level that is warranted or can 
be controlled by a particular firm. Also, the aggregation of data may neutralize 
the noise contained in firm-level accounting and market variables. This essay 
will test whether macroeconomic variables provide additional information 
beyond firm-specific accounting and market information in assessing the 
probability of corporate default.    
Finally, this chapter explores how the default risk of Chinese companies is 
correlated and clustered. Lennox (1999), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and 
Moody’s (2006) showed significant industry fixed-effects in the bankruptcy of 
US firms after controlling for accounting and market variables, suggesting that 
bankruptcy risk was clustered by industry and that intra-industry bankruptcy 
risk was correlated because of common observable risk factors. Similar 
industry fixed-effects will be tested in this chapter. It is well understood that 
when information quality is poor, risk factors are likely to become latent. 
Therefore, in an alternative specification, instead of fixed-effects, industry 
random effects will be tested. That implies that while default risk is clustered 
by industry, the correlation of intra-industry default risk is due to common 
unobservable risk factors. The test is conducted by estimating a shared frailty 
model where cluster effects are incorporated into the model as independent 
and identically distributed random variables. 
The main data of this chapter is from National University of Singapore (NUS) 
Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) corporate default database. After data 
cleaning, there are 1,897 public listed non-financial companies in the sample. 
During the period from 1994 to 2010, 201 firms had defaulted. Through this 




database, quarterly financial statements and daily stock price information for 
all these firms can be obtained, as well as interest rate and macroeconomic 
variables during the study period. This chapter also elaborates the RMI 
database by additional variables such as firm-specific ownership structure and 
China’s effective exchange rate.     
Firstly, the default probability of Chinese companies will be assessed using a 
standard Cox proportional hazards model with only firm-level accounting and 
market variables. The results indicate that several variables, such as distance-
to-default (DTD), cash to total asset ratio and net income to total asset ratio, 
have a significant impact on the possibility of corporate default, despite the 
concern that accounting variables can be easily manipulated in China and that 
market variables are noisy because of market inefficiency. In the next version 
of the model, state ownership and macroeconomic variables, such as short-
term bank lending rate, effective exchange rate, growth in money supply, the 
coincident index and inflation, are added. Interestingly, the results show that 
state ownership has a strong negative impact on corporate default, confirming 
the conjecture that state ownership is overall a benefit to Chinese companies. 
The macroeconomic variables also strongly predict corporate default. After 
adding these variables, the accounting and market variables remain significant 
and the model fit is improved. The cumulative accuracy profiles (CAP curves) 
of the two sets of models are compared and the results indicate that including 
state ownership and macroeconomic variables increases within-sample 
predictive power. 
Following the Bloomberg industry classification, all corporations in the 
sample are classified into nine categories. The raw default rates are 




significantly different among different industries, with the consumer-cyclical 
industry having the highest default rate while the energy and utilities industry 
has the lowest default rate. In a fixed-effects model, the risk of corporations 
entering default is significantly higher in certain industries, such as 
communications, diversified and technology, after controlling for accounting, 
market, ownership and macroeconomic variables. In the shared frailty model, 
statistically significant random effects are allowed, suggesting that the risk of 
default is correlated within each industry because of common unobservable 
risk factors.  
The model developed here is useful for risk assessment and management. This 
chapter also has several implications for investors. First, financial statements 
and stock price and volatility provide useful but insufficient information about 
the health of Chinese companies. Thus, lenders and investors should be aware 
of other factors that affect their lending and investment risk. From a portfolio 
management perspective, macroeconomic factors are more difficult to 
diversify away. Second, SOEs differ from non-SOEs not only in observable 
ways (through their financial statements and stock market indicators), but also 
in non-observable ways (as reflected by their lower marginal default risk). The 
exact mechanism through which state ownership helps SOEs avoid default 
deserves further research. Finally, the default risk of Chinese companies is 
clearly clustered, as suggested by the industry fixed-effects or the industry 
random effects that were found. However, if the intra-industry default 
correlation is indeed due to common latent factors as the random effects model 
suggests, then that source of default risk cannot be diversified away. The time-




series characteristics of the frailty factor should be further studied, for example 
by following Duffie et al. (2009), to better understand portfolio default risk. 
This chapter has clear policy implications. For example, it found that the 
effective exchange rate is negative related to corporate default, which suggests 
that depreciating the Chinese RMB would not only reduce the profitability of 
many Chinese companies but also significantly increase the default risk of 
corporations. Money supply, bank lending rate and inflation also have 
significant impacts on corporate default, suggesting that policy makers should 
take into consideration the impact of monetary policy on corporate default.      
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: in section 4.2, the relationship 
between this chapter and prior literature are presented; section 4.3 show the 
data and empirical methodology; the comprehensive empirical results are 
presented in section 4.4; and concluding remarks are in the final section. 
4.2 Related Literature 
The credit risk of corporations is very well-studied and several corporate 
bankruptcy prediction models have been developed based on different 
methods. Some well-known studies attempt to predict corporate default using 
accounting-based variables. After Beaver (1966), many studies predicting 
corporate default based on accounting ratios quickly appeared. Beaver (1966) 
applied a business failure prediction model based on financial ratios and 
showed that certain financial ratios gave statistically significant signals for 
judging corporate failure. Altman (1968) argued that the Univariate 
Discriminant Analysis used by Beaver (1966) could be confusing in predicting 
failure, and extended Beaver (1966)’s analysis by combining several measures 




in a Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model. Altman et al. (1977) 
improved their bankruptcy classification model to a more accurate Zeta 
analysis that could predict corporate insolvency up to five years before the 
event.  
Since the 1980s, the Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) model has 
been criticized on the grounds that its requirements are restrictive. Some other 
methods, such as logit Analysis (LA) and probit Analysis (PA), have emerged 
to overcome the limitation of the MDA model. Ohlson (1980) was the first to 
apply logit regression method to predict corporate failure. He used conditional 
logit models to predict the probability of failure for US firms, and was 
followed by Menash (1984). Helfert (1982) developed the cash components 
model to predict corporate default. Genry, Newbold, and Whitford (1985) 
redesigned the Helfert (1982) cash components model and adopted the logit 
regression method for their analysis. Besides the logit regression model, other 
studies have used probit analysis for analysing failure. Zmijewski (1984) 
criticized the sampling approach of the logit regression method, and developed 
a weighted probit bankruptcy prediction model.  
All of these approaches predict future bankruptcy based on accounting ratios 
drawn from a firm’s financial statements. While accounting ratios are 
important for predicting corporate default, and models based on accounting 
ratios provide a good framework for predicting corporate default, there are 
several criticisms regarding the use of accounting ratios for predicting failure. 
First, accounting ratios tend to look backward and reflect past performance. 
Thus, they are not effective for predicting the future status of companies, 




which means their ability to predict corporate future bankruptcy is 
questionable. Second, accounting measures underestimate the book value of 
assets because of accounting conventions (e.g. historical cost) (Charalambakis, 
Espenlauby, and Garrett 2009). Third, sometimes, accounting cannot reflect 
the real performance of corporations, because accounting data can be 
manipulated by management (Agarwal and Taffler 2008a).  
To overcome the shortcomings of accounting ratios, researchers began to 
include market-driven variables in their models. Compared with backward-
looking accounting ratios, the information in stock prices tends to be more 
forward looking. Information that may not be contained in accounting 
statements could be reﬂected in the price of stocks if the companies are listed 
and frequently traded. Black and Scholes (1973), and Merton (1974) 
established a market-based approach by using an option pricing method. A 
firm’s capital structure is assumed to be composed by equity and a zero-
coupon bond with maturity T and face value of D. The firm’s equity is simply 
a European call option with maturity T and strike price D on the asset value 
and, therefore, the firm’s debt value is just the asset value minus the equity 
value. Under this model, default can occur only when the debt matures, that is, 
when the firm’s assets are no longer sufficient to cover debt obligations, a 
scenario that is odds with reality. Black and Cox (1976) relaxed this 
assumption and proposed that default may occur any time between the 
issuance and maturity of the debt when the firm’s assets are no longer 
sufficient to cover debt obligations. Several studies, such as Crosbie and Bohn 
(2002), Hillegeist et al. (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Bharath and 
Shumway (2008), Reisz and Perlich (2007), further developed this market-




based concept to determine the possibility of corporate failure. Crosbie and 
Bohn (2002) extended the contingent claims framework approach and 
transformed distance-to-default into an expected default frequency (EDF) 
using an empirical default distribution. Vassalou and Xing (2004) computed 
the default likelihood indicator (DLI) to measure bankruptcy probability in 
such a framework. Hillegeist et al. (2004) used a similar approach to compute 
bankruptcy probability and found that the BSM-probability methodology 
outperforms both Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score in bankruptcy 
prediction. The difference between Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et 
al. (2004) is a technical issue around adjustments for dividends. 
There are a number of problems for using market-based models to predict 
bankruptcy. As Saunders and Allen (2002) argue, these models are based on 
some unusual assumptions, such as the non-normality of stock returns and the 
similarity of all debts. Some papers have attempted to combine accounting and 
market data to predict corporate default (Shumway 2001; Campbell et al. 
2008).  
Both accounting-based and market- driven variables play an important role in 
predicting corporate default, and substantial research has been done to 
improve the models that use kinds of variables. However, when these models 
are applied to developing countries, especially China, information quality 
becomes a potential problem, which should be a key concern. There is an 
urgent need to explore information beyond accounting and market variables to 
predict the default of Chinese companies. 
 




4.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
The data used in this chapter is from the NUS RMI’s corporate default 
database.
23
 This database contains the historical observations of all 
corporations that have been listed on the two Chinese stock exchanges, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, from 1991 to 
2010. Over this period, 2,063 companies were listed during this period
24
. After 
excluding financial companies, 1,897 companies were left in the sample.
25
 
Figure 4-2 depicts the number of new listings in each year, that is, the number 
of new companies that entered the sample each year. There were a large 
number of new listings between 1993 and 1995 and between 2006 and 2007. 
274 companies were listed in 1994 alone. The number of new listings declined 
substantially after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, as well as after the 
recent Great Recession.  
                                                          
23
 More information on this database is available at: http://www.rmi.nus.edu.sg/ 
24
 About 3 percent of the companies were excluded from the analysis because of 
missing data. 
25 To implement Merton's model and calculate Distance to Default (DTD), the so-
called KMV assumption is typically adopted. This assumption sets T-t to one year 
and L to the firm's book measure of short-term debt plus one half of its long-term 
debt. The KMV implementation assumption becomes problematic for financial firms. 
Financial firms typically have a large amount of liabilities that are neither classified 
as short-term nor long-term debt, and thus the KMV assumption would grossly 
understate the amount of debt. Therefore, financial firms are excluded from the 
sample. 




Figure 4-2 Number of New Listings by Year 
 
Note: Newly listed companies are those enter the sample each year. The Y-axis 
measures the company  number, while the X-axis indicates the year. 
 
The NUS RMI database includes information on corporate events for all the 
companies in the sample. Corporate events include bankruptcies, default, debt 
offerings, mergers and acquisitions, stock repurchases, stock splits, and 
changes of industry. Default is defined as one of the following: bankruptcy, 
coupon and/or principal payment default, loan payment delay, loan covenant 
violation, debt restructuring, and subsidiary default. Out of the 1,627 corporate 
events in the sample, only a small fraction is default. 
The quarterly financial statements for each company, which contain the 
necessary accounting information, are obtained. The event histories of all the 
companies give rise to 77,481 company-quarter observations. The stock price, 






























day over the study period are also obtained. The indices of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are also included in the data. 
Ownership data is collected from RESSET, a data company in China. 
RESSET traces the ownership structure of each public company over time. We 
are particularly interested in state ownership, which is calculated as the 
number of state shares divided by the total number of shares outstanding. It is 
a time-varying variable, as state shares can be transferred to domestic 
institutions upon the approval of China’s Securities Regulatory Commission 
although they cannot be traded.  
Most of the macroeconomic variables are obtained from the RMI’s database. 
This dataset is augmented by the real effective exchange rate time series from 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
4.3.2 Empirical Methodology  
The default probability model estimated is a standard Cox proportional hazard 
model that was used by Shumway (2001) to predict corporate bankruptcy, and  
is used widely in the mortgage default literature (e.g. Quigley and Van Order 
1991; Vandell et al. 1993; An. Deng, and Gabriel 2011). The hazard model is 
convenient mainly because it allows us to work with the full sample of 
companies despite some observations being censored when collecting the data.  
Assume that the hazard rate of default of a company at period T since it enters 
our sample follows the form: 
                                                     
                     




Here  0h T  is the baseline hazard function, which only depends on the age 
(duration), T , of the firm and is an arbitrary function that allows for a flexible 
default pattern over time
26
; 
itX  is a vector of covariates for each individual 
firm i  that includes all the identifiable default risk factors that can be either 
time-constant or time-varying ( t  dependent). In this proportional hazard 
model, changes in covariates shift the hazard rate proportionally without 
otherwise affecting the duration pattern of default. The hazard model is 




The first set of covariates included in the model consists of the established 
accounting and market variables from the existing literature. These include: 
distant-to-default (DTD), cash to total asset ratio (Cash), net income to total 
asset ratio (Net Income), market-to-book asset ratio (M/B), idiosyncratic 
volatility (Sigma), asset growth rate (Mu), and market cap (Size)
28
. Other 
accounting variables, such as working capital, retained earnings, EBIT, sales, 
current ratio, and average leverage ratio, are also considered. Since accounting 
statements are usually released several months after the reporting period, all 
the accounting variables are lagged by one quarter. This is similar to the 
treatment in Duan, Sun, and Wang (2010).  
The focus in the chapter is on information beyond accounting and market 
variables. The first such variable considered is ownership structure. Many 
Chinese companies are either completely state-owned (SOEs) or owned to 
                                                          
26
 Notice that the company’s live duration time T is different from the natural time t, 
which allows identification of the model. 
27
 Refer to Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for details about the MLE estimation of 
the hazard model.  
28
 Duan, Sun, and Wang (2010) provide detailed definitions of these variables. 




some degree by different parts of the state. SOEs are products of China’s 
“socialist transformation” completed in 1956 and were originally government 
agencies set up in various industrial sectors to fulfil China’s “planned 
economy”. After several waves of reform during China’s implementation of a 
“market-oriented economy”, most SOEs became shareholder-owned and many 
are now listed on domestic or international stock exchanges. However, state 
governments including the central, provincial, municipal and local district 
governments still have large ownership shares in many of them. The focus in 
this chapter is on assessing the impact of state ownership after controlling for 
accounting and market variables. The marginal effect of state ownership 
possibly exists because SOEs and companies with substantial state ownership 
usually have extended social capital, such as bank lending relationships, 
government support, and subsidies.   
The macroeconomic variables included in the model are: the short-term bank 
lending rate, growth in money supply, real effective exchange rate, stock 
market return, inflation and a coincident index. Firms rely heavily on short-
term debt so the short-term bank lending rate is a key variable for their 
operational costs. Money supply growth is an indicator of the corporate 
financing environment. China has a huge trade surplus and many companies 
are export related. Therefore, the exchange rate has a significant impact on 
Chinese companies. The real effective exchange rate takes into consideration 
the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and other major currencies 
including US dollar and Euro. The return on the stock market is an overall 
measure of corporate health and profitability, while the coincident index and 
inflation measure the health of the macro economy. Other macroeconomic 




variables, including per capita disposable income, real GDP growth, 
unemployment rate, yield slope, consumer confidence, producer price index, 
and government spending, are also considered.  
The last set of variables considered is industry dummies. Following the 
Bloomberg classification of industries, all the companies are classified into the 
following nine industries: Basic Materials, Communications, Consumer 
Cyclical, Consumer Noncyclical, Diversified, Energy, Industrial, Technology 
and Utilities
29
. Dummy variables are used in the model to capture industry-
fixed effects. The utilities industry is used as the reference group. 
Instead of using industry dummies to form a fixed-effects model, industry 
random- effects using a shared frailty model are considered. In this model, 
default is clustered by industry and the correlations between defaults in the 
same industry (cluster) are modelled with a random component for the hazard 
function. The hazard rate for the i th individual in the j th cluster is  
                                           (   
     )                  
                                                                                                         
Again  0h T  is the baseline hazard function. itZ  is the vector of covariates, 
which are all the same covariates in
itX  except the industry dummies. j is the 
random effect for industry (cluster) j . The random components 1 2, , m  
                                                          
29 The whole financial industry is excluded from the sample. Following Daun et al. 
(2010), to implement Merton’s model to calculate the distance to default, the so-
called KMV assumption is typically adopted where the short-term debt and long-term 
debt are used. However, financial firms typically have large amount of liabilities that 
neither classified as short-term nor long-term debt, and the KMV assumption 
becomes problematic which grossly understate the amount of debt of financial firms. 
Based on this consideration, the financial industry is excluded from the regression 
sample.  




are assumed to be independent and identically distributed as a normal random 
variable with mean 0 and an unknown variance  .   will be estimated 
together with coefficients  with MLE30.    
4.4 Empirical Results 
The study period of this chapter is from the first quarter of 1994 (1994Q1) to 
the last quarter of 2010 (2010Q4)
31
. In Table 4-1, a summary of the total 
number of companies in the sample as well as the total number of defaults and 
total number of firms that were delisted during the study period are presented. 
Among the 1897 non-financial companies, 201 defaulted and 21 were delisted. 
The cumulative default rate is 10.6% and the cumulative delisting rate is 1.1% 
during 1994-2010.  
Table 4–1 Status Distribution of Sample 
Status Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
1 201 10.6 201 10.60 
2 21 1.11 222 11.70 
3 1,675 88.30 1,897 100 
Total 1,897 100 1,897 100 
Note: status=1 indicates default; status=2 indicates delisting; and status=3 indicates 
survival. 
 
The number of defaults in each year is plotted in Figure 4-3. Given the small 
proportion of delisting in the sample, delisting is not modelled separately. 
Instead, it is treated as censored. 
                                                          
30
 See Therneau and Grambsch (2000) for more details. 
31
 Given the unavailability of many variables, the left censored time in the data is 
1994Q1 (some companies were listed before 1994). This creates a left censoring 
problem. How this left censoring affects the results is assessed and little impact is 
found.     




Figure 4-3 Number of Defaults in Each Year 
 
Note: Number shown here is the default number of companies in each year. There is a 
clear increase of the number of defaults from 1997, and the peak value appears in 
2005, following by 2004. The Y-axis measures the default number, while the X-axis 
indicates the year. 
 
Preliminary analysis shows that accounting and market variables have 
unreasonably high variations, possibly due to outliers. All accounting and 
market variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. In Table 4-2, the 
descriptive statistics of covariates after winsorization are reported. There are 
still large variations in the distance-to-default ratio. Most companies in most 
of the quarters have positive DTD, suggesting they are not near default risk. 
The average cash-to-total asset ratio is about 15 percent and the average net 
income-to-total asset ratio is about 4 percent. The average market-to-book 
ratio (M/B) is almost 4 times, suggesting that some companies are potentially 



























Table 4–2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
dtd 65,979 6.2900 5.2449 -0.0428 29.2149 
cash 65,925 0.1541 0.1278 0.0036 0.6448 
Net income 65,872 0.0417 0.05831 -0.1205 0.2594 
m2b 44,457 3.7710 2.9862 0.0591 17.4842 
sigma 59,451 1.8025 1.7764 0.0382 10.0085 
size 48,499 -2.6215 1.1865 -5.9912 0.3754 
State share 77,001 0.2720 0.2900 0 1 
Stock return 77,001 0.0054 0.0539 -0.1226 0.1989 
CHLDI6M 77,001 6.0004 1.4591 4.86 10.8 
m1gr 77,001 0.0137 0.0110 -0.0168 0.0472 
REER 77,001 91.6743 7.0523 65.18 105.3667 
coincindex 77,001 99.3892 3.2610 93.05 109.4067 
inflation 77,001 2.9235 4.8038 -2.1667 26.9 
Note: DTD: distance-to-default, which is a volatility adjusted leverage measure based 
on Merton (1974). DTD in this chapter is calculated following Duan et al. (2010), 
which is described in detail in appendix 1; Cash: the sum of cash and short-term 
investments of corporate; Net income: the net income of corporate; m2b: market to 
book value ratio; Sigma: 1-year idiosyncratic volatility, calculated by regressing 
individual monthly stock return on the value-weighted corresponding stock market 
monthly return over the preceding 12 months. SIGMA is the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the regression. Following Shumway (2001), SIGMA is treated as 
missing if there are less than 12 monthly returns; Size: log of the ratio of firm’s 
market equity value to the average market value; State share: proxy of state 
ownership. It is calculated as the ratio of state owned share on total shares; Stock 
return: firm’s stock return; CHLDI6M: China lending rate of short than 6 month, 
which is regulated by the People’s Bank of China; m1gr: proxy of money supply in 
China; REER: real effective exchange rate of China; Coincindex: coincident index of 
China; Inflation: inflation rate in China. 
 
In the benchmark default probability model, only firm-specific accounting and 
market information are included. The estimates of the benchmark hazard 
model are contained in Table 4-3. All the covariates are significant at the 95% 
significance level. For example, distance-to-default (DTD) has a negative 
relation with default – the higher the distance from default, the lower the 
probability of default. Cash-to-total asset ratio (Cash) and net income-to-total 




asset ratio (Net Income) are also negatively correlated with default probability. 
Surprisingly, market-to-book ratio (M/B) has a positive relationship with 
default while idiosyncratic volatility (Sigma) has a negative relationship with 
default. In an efficient market, a high M/B implies high growth opportunities 
and a bright future for a company, and thus lower chance of default. A 
possible explanation of the surprising result for Chinese companies is that 
some companies are significantly over-valued and will thus fall into default 
easily. This is consistent with the claim that some issuers in China use IPO as 
an opportunity to raise capital that is not used subsequently for production and 
operations. Finally, size has a significant negative impact on default, meaning 
that large companies are less likely to default. Other accounting and market 
variables such as working capital, retained earnings, earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), sales, and leverage are ruled out due to multicollinearity 














Table 4–3 Estimates for Benchmark Hazard Model 
Variables Model 1 Hazard Ratio 
dtd -0.5082 *** 
(0.1128) 
0.602 
cash -0.7675 *** 
(0.1347) 
0.464 
netincome -0.2170 ** 
(0.1020) 
0.805 






size -0.2679 *** 
(0.0701) 
0.765 
Industry Fixed Effects No 
Random Effects No 
Number of Observations 77,001 
-2 LOG L 2607.692 
AIC 2619.692 
SBC 2639.512 
Note: The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 4-2.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Before moving to the model that includes state ownership, a comparison 
between the ownership structure of default and non-default firms is made in 
Figure 4-4. The average level of state ownership in companies that have 
defaulted and that of companies that have never defaulted are compared. 
Interestingly, it can be seen that companies that enter default have a higher 
average level of state ownership.  
 
 




Figure 4-4 State Shares Comparison 
 
 
Note: In both Panel A and panel B, Y-axis measures the state shares, while X-axis 


























B.Comparison between Default and Non-default Companies 




Does that mean state ownership is a bad thing? Later results that will be 
discussed later will show the opposite. Meanwhile, it has been noticed that 
state-controlled companies have very different characteristics from non-state-
controlled companies. As shown in Table 4-4, most of the companies in the 
sample are not state controlled; only 8% are state-controlled. On average, the 
level of state ownership in state-controlled companies is nearly 11.5 times that 
of non-state controlled companies (0.6262/0.0551).  
Table 4–4 Comparison between State Controlled and Non-State Controlled 
Companies 
 
To understand the relation between default probability and macroeconomic 
variables, each macroeconomic variable eventually used in the model is 
plotted against the conditional default rate (number of defaults divided by 
number of companies outstanding) in Figures 4-5. Descriptive statistics about 






Obs. Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
State Controlled (state 
owned shares >50%) 155 0.6262 0.0992 0.5004 0.946 
Non-State Controlled (state 
owned shares =<50%) 1742 0.0551 0.1219 0 0.4994 
Total 1897 0.1018 0.1973 0 0.9460 




Figure 4-5 Macro Variables and Default Rate 
A. Stock Return and Conditional Default Rate 
 















































































































































































































































































C.  Money supply growth and Conditional Default Rate 
 
 

















































































































































































































































































E.  Coincident Index and Conditional Default Rate 
 
 
F.  Inflation and Conditional Default Rate 
 
Note: The definitions of the variables are shown in Table 4-2. The left Y-axis in all 
panels measures the conditional default rate, while the right Y-axis measure the 












































































































































































































































































In Table 4-5, the MLE estimates of the expanded default hazard model, which 
includes state ownership and macroeconomic variables as well as accounting 
and market variables, are presented. It can be seen that state ownership has a 
strong negative impact on default probability. According to the hazard ratio, a 
fully state-owned company has half the default probability of a completely 
privately-owned firm. Except for stock market return, all other 
macroeconomic variables are significantly related to the risk of corporate 
default. For example, the real effective exchange rate has a negative impact on 
default probability. This is because the higher the effective exchange rate is, 
the easier Chinese firms find it to export their goods. Money supply also has a 
significant impact on default: the higher the growth in money supply, the 
lower the default probability of Chinese companies. This is possibly because 
higher money supply leads to easier financing for corporations. However, at 
the same time, too much money may induce high inflation, which is bad for 
corporations, as our results show that inflation is positively related to default 
probability. The coincident index measures the health of the macro economy, 
and is negatively related to the probability of default. The negative 
relationship between the short-term lending rate and the probability of default 
is difficult to explain. Typically, high short-term lending rates mean that the 
cost of capital is high for corporations, which should have a negative impact 








Table 4–5 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Probability of Corporate 
Default after Including State Ownership and Macroeconomic Variables 




cash -0.7962 *** 
(0.1373) 
0.451 
netincome -0.1744 * 
(0.0975) 
0.84 
m2b 0.1589 *** 
(0.0461) 
1.172 
sigma -0.2338 ** 
(0.1143) 
0.792 
size -0.2115 *** 
(0.0706) 
0.809 
State share -0.5637 *** 
(0.0984) 
0.569 
Stock return 0.0994 
(0.0954) 
1.105 
CHLDI6M -0.5759 ** 
(0.2422) 
0.562 






coincindex -0.6608 *** 
(0.1658) 
0.516 
inflation 0.8094 *** 
(0.2698) 
2.247 




Number of Observations 
77,001 






Note: The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 4-2.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
After including state ownership and macroeconomic variables in the model, 
none of the accounting and market variables changed their directionality or 
significance, besides net income which became marginally significant. The 




other accounting and market variables remained strongly significant. 
Comparing the AIC and SBC measures in Table 4-3 and Table 4-6, it can be 
seen that the additional variables improve model fit significantly. In Figure 4-7, 
the Cumulative Accuracy Profiles (CAP curves) of the benchmark model and 
the expanded model where state ownership and macroeconomic variables are 
added are compared. The expanded model dominates the benchmark model in 
terms of within-sample predicting power. In fact, adding state ownership and 
macroeconomic variables increases the overall accuracy ratio from 50 percent 
to 57 percent.    
Next, the analysis of the correlation and clustering of corporate defaults within 
industries is presented. Before proceeding to the results, a comparison of 
default rates among different industries is presented. From Table 4-6, it can be 
seen that the consumer and industrial sectors have the highest default rate, 
following by basic materials and consumer, non-cyclical. The default rate of 












Table 4–6 Clustering of Corporate Default within Industries 
Industry sector 
number 






10002 Basic Materials 301 37 12.29 
10003 Communications 87 14 16.09 
10004 Consumer,  Cyclical 369 42 11.38 
10005 Consumer,  Non-cyclical 314 36 11.46 
10006 Diversified 37 10 27.03 
10007 Energy 45 5 11.11 
10011 Industrial 569 42 7.38 
10013 Technology 105 13 12.38 
10014 Utilities 70 2 2.86 
Total 1,897 201 100 
 
The number of default companies as a percentage of the total number of 
companies in a particular industry is also presented in Figure 4-6. The highest 
default rate is found in the diversified sector, followed by the communications 
sector. Consistent with Table 4-6, the default rate within the utilities industry 











Figure 4-6 Default Rate within Industry 
 
Note: The default rate within industry is calculated as the number of companies 
entered default as a percentage of the number of companies in a particular industry. 
The Y-axis measures the default rate, whiele the X-axis measure the industry sector. 
 
In Table 4-7, the MLE estimates of the fixed-effects model are presented. Here 
the reference group is the utilities industry. It can be seen that all other eight 
industries show higher default rates, ceteris paribus. For example, the default 
risk in the communications, diversified and technology industries are several 
times that of the utilities industry. All the accounting and market variables, as 
well as state ownership and macroeconomic variables that are significant in 
Table 4-5, remain significant. Based on the AIC and SBC measures, it can be 
seen that adding industry fixed-effects slightly improves the model fit. This is 

















10002 10003 10004 10005 10006 10007 10011 10013 10014




Table 4–7 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Probability of Corporate 
Default with Industry Fixed Effects 























































































Number of Observations 77,001 
-2 LOG L 2520.237 
AIC 2562.237 
SBC 2631.606 




Note: The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 4-2.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Figure 4-7 Cumulative Accuracy Profiles 
 
Note: Model 1 is the benchmark hazard model, where only firm-specific accounting 
and market information are included; Model 2 is the MLE estimates of the expanded 
default hazard model, which includes state ownership and macroeconomic variables 
as well as accounting and market variables; Model 3 is the MLE estimates by 
including the industry fixed-effects.  
 
Finally, the MLE estimates of the random-effects model are presented in Table 
4-8. Panel A presents the estimates of all other covariates rather than the 
industry random effects. It can be seen that they are very consistent with those 
results in the expanded model (Table 4-5) and those in the fixed-effects model 
(Table 4-7). Panel B contains our estimate of the random effect parameter , 
the variance of the random effect, and its standard error. Based on the Wald-
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solutions to the random effects of all different industries. The exponentiated 
estimate is equivalent to the hazard ratio in the covariate estimates. It can be 
seen that again the default risk of the communications, diversified and 
technology industries are much higher than that of the utilities industry. 
However, the differences among the various industries are not as dramatic as 
those shown in the fixed-effects model. The results of the random effects 
model suggest that the default risk of Chinese companies is correlated and 
clustered within industries, and that the correlation is potentially due to 
common unobservable risk factors. 
Table 4–8 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Probability of Corporate 
Default with Random Effects 
A. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 


























































B. Covariance Parameter Estimates 




C. Type 3 Tests   
Effect Wald Chi-Square 
Adjusted Pr > ChiSq 
dtd 21.5173 <.0001 
cash 34.7652 <.0001 
netincome 2.5836 0.1077 
m2b 11.0756 0.0009 
sigma 5.2318 0.0221 
size 9.0784 0.0026 
State share 31.2054 <.0001 
Stock return 1.1118 0.2917 
CHLDI6M 5.4714 0.0193 
m1gr 4.4005 0.0359 
REER 5.257 0.0218 
coincindex 15.7396 <.0001 
inflation 9.2326 0.0024 
industry_sector_num 18.0078 0.005 









95% CL for 
Exponentiated 
10002 0.0169 0.2159 -0.4064 0.4401 1.017 0.666 1.553 
10003 0.4426 0.271 -0.0885 0.9737 1.557 0.915 2.648 
10004 -0.2903 0.2102 -0.7023 0.1217 0.748 0.495 1.129 
10005 -0.0074 0.2169 -0.4325 0.4177 0.993 0.649 1.519 
10006 0.2752 0.2898 -0.2928 0.8431 1.317 0.746 2.324 
10007 0.1312 0.3329 -0.5213 0.7837 1.14 0.594 2.19 
10011 -0.2345 0.2099 -0.6459 0.177 0.791 0.524 1.194 
10013 0.3805 0.2752 -0.1588 0.9199 1.463 0.853 2.509 
10014 -0.7142 0.3152 -1.3319 -0.0965 0.49 0.264 0.908 
Number of Observations                                               77,001 
SBC 2631.606 
Note: The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 4-2.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10% level;  
** Significant at the 5% level;  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 





In the context of the United States, accounting variables are good indications 
of the profitability and health of corporations and thus are found to be 
predictive of corporate bankruptcy. Meanwhile, market variables such as 
market price and volatility contain full forward-looking information of a 
firm’s performance and also help predict the likelihood that firms will declare 
bankruptcy. In fact, Chava and Jarrow (2004) demonstrated that market 
variables were very informative of bankruptcy and that accounting variables 
added little predictive power when market variables were included in the 
bankruptcy model. 
However, when applied to Chinese companies, researchers need to worry 
about the information quality of the accounting and market variables available 
to them, as the accounting information of Chinese companies is subject to 
manipulation while the market price and volatility of Chinese stocks are not 
very informative due to market inefficiency. Therefore, in this chapter, the 
usefulness of information beyond accounting and market variables in 
predicting corporate default in China is explored. 
The results indicate that accounting and market variables do provide useful 
information about corporate default. However, other variables such as state 
ownership, the real effective exchange rate, money supply, short-term lending 
rate, coincident index and inflation provide additional information. They help 
increase the predictive power of accounting and market variables. The results 
also indicate that the default risk of Chinese companies is correlated and 
clustered within industry. Certain industries such as communications and 




technology tend to have a higher probability of default risk than others. The 
results of this essay provide several investment and policy implications. The 
model built in this chapter will be a tool for risk assessment and management. 
Future research should try to understand why state ownership helps to reduce 
corporate default risk. 
4.6 Appendix: Estimating Distance-to-Default (DTD) 
This appendix shows the calculation method of DTD following the Merton 
(1974) model and explains the numerical scheme employed to calculate 
distance-to-default. Merton’s model assumes that firms are financed by equity 
and one single pure discount bond with maturity data T a d principal L. the 
asset value    follows geometric Brownian motion: 
                 
Due to limited liability, the equity value at maturity is               . 
Therefore, the equity value at time     by the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula becomes: 
            
              √    
where r is the instantaneous risk free rate, N(.) is the cumulative distribution 
function for standard normal random variable, and  
   
      ⁄       
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According to Merton’s model, the company’s bankruptcy probability at time t 
is          where      denotes distance to default and it is  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The main findings of this study are as follows.  
The first essay studies whether heterogeneity in borrowers’ time preferences 
correlates with their decision to default on their mortgage payments. We 
hypothesize that naïve borrowers with present-biased preference are more 
likely to select interest-only loans, so that they can enjoy the immediate 
benefits of homeownership and postpone their mortgage payment costs. 
Sophisticated borrowers with present-biased preference, on the other hand, are 
fully aware of their future self-control problems and know their future 
preferences exactly, even though they may differ from their current 
preferences. Therefore, they are more likely to choose 30-year adjustable-rate 
loans. In contrast, borrowers with time-consistent preference tend to choose 
30-year fixed-rate loans, which are fully amortizing mortgage loans where 
the interest rate on the note remains the same through the term of the loan. 
Using individual loan-level mortgage data principally collected by BlackBox 
Logic (BBL) and home loan applications and originations data collected by 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), the empirical analysis 
comprises a logistic regression, where year of origination and termination and 
property state location are set as fixed effects, to examine the impact of time 
preferences on mortgage choice and default decisions. Firstly, the default 
behavior of naïve borrowers who selected interest-only loans relative to those
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 who selected 30 years fixed-rate loans is studied. The results indicate that 
borrowers with both 5-year interest-only loans and 10-year interest-only loans 
are more likely to default than dynamically-consistent borrowers who chose 
30-year fixed-rate loans. The next study examines the default behavior of 
borrowers who chose 30 years adjustable-rate loans relative to 30 years fixed-
rate loans. The results indicate that the default rate of sophisticated borrower 
with present-biased preference is higher than borrowers with time-consistent 
preference. Lastly, the default behavior of borrowers who take up interest-only 
loans and 30 years adjustable-rate loans is compared to those who selected 30 
years fixed-rate loans. The results indicate that present bias is highly 
correlated with mortgage default, and borrowers who exhibit present-biased 
preference in their choice of mortgage have a substantially higher probability 
of default. The association between present bias and mortgage default holds 
when controlling for other loan characteristics and housing price. Moreover, 
all of the results hold after using propensity score matching, based on 
borrowers’ characteristics (including income, race, sex) and loan 
characteristics (e.g. original loan balance, location of property, origination 
year etc.). These results are therefore the first direct support for the claim that 
the mortgage default decisions of borrowers is related to their different time 
preferences. 
The second essay studies the risk of mortgage partial prepayments and the 
process through which mortgage borrowers learn to make partial prepayment 
decisions in the residential mortgage market in China. The learning dynamics 
are measured by studying individual borrowers’ repeated mortgage partial 
prepayment behavior. The empirical model is based on the conditional fixed 
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effects multinomial logit model (FEMNL). Using a rich set of individual 
mortgage loan history data from a leading mortgage lender in China, the 
empirical results indicate that option theory is not applicable to China, and that 
other investment opportunities are important in explaining mortgage partial 
prepayment behavior. Moreover, borrowers’ characteristics, such as age, 
occupation, job position, gender, and income, significantly impact partial 
prepayment behavior. Thus, these attributes may be used to screen loan 
applicants and for determining potential high-risk borrowers. Lastly, and most 
importantly, a borrower’s partial prepayment behavior follows the 
reinforcement learning process. A borrower’s partial prepayment decision not 
only depends upon current stage variables (like other investment 
opportunities) and borrower characteristics, but also learning through past 
experience. Borrowers who have made partial prepayments in earlier stages 
are more likely to make the same decision in the future. In particular, learning 
from experience increases the probability of partial prepayment by around 
26.9 percentage points, and the experience of learning from others increases 
the probability of partial prepayment by around 1.8 percentage points. 
Moreover, the results indicate that learning dynamics are not monotonic, and 
recent experience plays a larger role than older experience in determining the 
partial prepayment decision. 
The third essay studies the value of information besides accounting and 
market variables in predicting the default of Chinese companies. In the US 
market, accounting and market variables provide useful information about 
corporate default. However, the information quality of accounting and market 
variables is often poorer in developing countries. To predict the default 
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probability of Chinese-listed companies, data from the National University of 
Singapore (NUS) Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) corporate default 
database is used. Firstly, a standard Cox proportional hazard model on the 
default probability of Chinese companies using firm-level accounting and 
market variables is tested. The results indicated that accounting and market 
variables provide useful information about corporate default. Next, the 
presence of state ownership and macroeconomic variables, such as short-term 
bank lending rate, effective exchange rate, growth in money supply, 
coincident index and inflation, were added into the model. These variables are 
found to provide additional information on the default of Chinese-listed 
corporations and significantly increasing the predictive power of accounting 
and market variables. The firms in the sample were classified into nine 
categories, following the Bloomberg industry classification. The results 
indicated that the default risk of Chinese companies was correlated and 
clustered within industries. Certain industries, such as communications and 
technology, tended to have higher default risk than others. The model built in 
this essay will be useful for risk assessment and management. 
5.2 Contributions 
This study fills the knowledge gap of loan repayment behavior of household 
and corporate from three aspects: residential mortgage default behavior, 
residential mortgage partial prepayment behavior and corporate default risk. 
More specifically: 
The first essay contributes to understanding current mortgage default behavior 
by presenting an alternative theory to explain the origins of the unobserved 
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heterogeneity of mortgage borrowers and how this unobserved heterogeneity 
affects borrowers’ default decisions and behavior. In the literature on 
mortgage default, many empirical studies have focused on the effects of 
transaction costs and unobserved heterogeneity on mortgage default. However, 
there has been no unifying theory to explain the underlying unobserved 
heterogeneity of borrowers. This essay filled this gap by assuming that this 
unobserved heterogeneity is based on borrowers’ time preferences. In addition, 
the study presented in this essay also sheds light on the studies of present-
biased preferences, which have been extensively addressed both in psychology 
and behavioral economics. Past research has found that present bias explains 
job search behavior, and that individual differences in time preference are an 
important predictor of many life outcomes, including gym contracts, smoking 
propensity, body-mass index, savings towards retirement, and credit card debt. 
However, researchers have not studied the effects of present bias on mortgage 
choice and default, and relatively few papers on mortgage choice and default 
have distinguished between naïve and sophisticated individuals. In this essay, 
heterogeneous time preferences among borrowers, as indicated by their 
mortgage choices, are used to explain the default behavior of present-biased 
borrowers. Different mortgage types are also used to differentiate naïve and 
sophisticated borrowers.  
The second essay contributes to the current mortgage payment literature by 
exploring partial prepayments. Despite the existence of many studies on 
default and prepayment behavior, few studies have paid attention to the risk of 
partial prepayment and the corresponding behavior of borrowers. In addition 
to filling in the gap in partial prepayment risk studies in mortgage markets, 
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this essay also contributes to the literature of reinforcement learning by 
studying the repeat partial prepayment behavior of individual borrowers. 
While many economic studies have analyzed learning in the laboratory or in 
the field, only a few papers have measured learning with household-level 
panel data, because of the challenges of getting such data. This essay fills this 
gap by studying learning behavior using household-level mortgage payment 
data.  
The third essay contributes to the literature on corporate default by exploring 
the usefulness of information beyond accounting and market variables in 
predicting Chinese corporate default. The model built in this study is useful 
for risk assessment and management, and also contributes to the investment 
community. In addition, this essay has strong policy implications. For example, 
it found that the effective exchange rate has a negative relationship with 
corporate default, which suggests that depreciating the Chinese RMB would 
not only reduce the profitability of many Chinese companies but also 
significantly increase the default risk of corporations. Money supply, bank 
lending rate, and inflation also significantly impact corporate default, 
suggesting that policy makers should take into consideration the impact of 
monetary policy on corporate default.     
 
CHAPTER FIVE                                                                          CONCLUSION 
156 
 
5.3 Limitations and Future Works 
No research is without limitations and this study is no exception. This section 
highlights the limitations of each of the essays, together with 
recommendations for further research.  
While the first essay only distinguished between sophisticate and fully naïve 
individuals, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) differentiated between naïve and 
partially naïve agents. Partially naïve agents believed their future selves would 
act with some short-term discount factor,  ̃   . In the case of completely 
naïve individuals,  ̃     . In the future, a survey of individuals could be 
done to identify each person’s time preference so that they can be assigned 
into one of three groups: sophisticates, full naïf and partial naïf. Moreover, 
future research could focus on the more difficult problem of exploring the 
theoretically-proposed causal link between present bias and mortgage default. 
In emerging markets, and especially in China, the availability of data is a 
challenge for academic research. The residential mortgage data used in the 
second essay is obtained from a leading lender from China. When issuing a 
mortgage loan, different lenders have different criteria for assessing the risk of 
borrowers. With the absence of lender variation, hidden risks affecting the 
probability of mortgage payments may be neglected. Future research should 
use more comprehensive data, which can be obtained from different banks in 
China, and capture the risk caused by lenders’ variation.  
In the third essay, a generally negative relationship between state ownership 
and the probability of corporate default is shown. However, there is no 
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detailed exploration of how this occurs and why state ownership should reduce 
the risk of corporate default. Future researchers should try to understand why 
state ownership can help to reduce corporate default risk. In addition, as the 
random effects model suggests, the intra-industry default correlation is indeed 
due to common latent factors, and source of default risk cannot be diversified 
away. The time-series characteristics of the frailty factor should be further 
studied, for example by following Duffie et al. (2009), to better understand 
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